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.PREFACE 
An exposure to three or four years' accounting work involved 
in maintaining reserve ledgers of Federal Reserve member bo.nks has led 
to some observation of the various ways in which the banks ad.Junt their 
reserve positions. This observation has prompted an interest in the 
monetary as well as the mechanical aspects of commercial bank reserves. 
The causes aDd effects ot changes in reserves upon bnnks individually, 
e.nd in the aggregate, have become an endless source of inquiry. To be 
able to relate banking theory to banking practice is to possess a rare 
opportunity. Yet one with such an opportunity becomes increasingly 
aware that it 1o very difficult to und.erstcmi or expl.nin in adequate 
terms the workings of our monetary system in America unleos one has an 
exceptiono.l degree of training. 
The well-being ot a nation is dependent in large part upon the 
state of its money. Bank reserve positions have a great deal to do with 
the state of our money. An impressive volume of study and evidence has 
been brought forth 1n Just the past few years to indicate that United 
States laws which establish the rules under which financial institutions 
operate need revising. Other, more readily understood topics, however, 
he.ve claimed the attention of the public und 1ts representatives in 
Congress. Little has been done to remedy serious shortcomin8s in 
banking laws. 
11 
This paper examines briefly these studies ns they rel.a.te to 
commercial bank reserve requirements with the thought that they deserve 
more attention. This paper is not concerned with the 100 per cent reserve 
pl.an, the ceiling reserve, the asset reserve, or other reserve proposa1s 
of pa.st years. It deals with current pl.enB. 
. Pa.rt a1' Chapter VI, based upon an unpublished paper prepared 
for internal. use at the Federal. Reserve Board, should not be used beyond 
the University' Without the author's permission. 
I am gratef'Ul to the following tor valuable re:f'erence material: 
George w. Mc.Kinney, Jr., Irving Trust Company; Albert B. cox, J:r., 
American 13snkers Asaociet1onJ and Levia B. Dembitz,, Federal Reserve BOe.rd. 
m...,. A. Wayne, President, Federal Reser1e Bank of Richmond.; Jrunes Parthemos 
of the Richmond Reserve Bank; and Evelyn B. Harrison, Columbia University, 
were kind enough to read this ::ia.nuscript ond contribute prized criticism. 
The patience aZJ.d assistance of my thesis adviser, Robert c. Burton of the 
University, is appreciated. Lastly, I must tba.nk Ruth M. F.ggleston tor 
vo.l.uable librury contributions, and .&:nnrruel o. Melichar or the Federal. 
Reserve Board who not only has furnished study sources tor.this paper, 
but who also bas been an esteemed teacher. 
It should be said that my association with the Richmond. Reserve 
Bank offers little reason to suppose tba.t these observations are any more 
credible than those of nny student. 
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CHA.Pr.ER I: 
INmODUCTION 
The Need for Bank Reserves 
Why do United States lnws require camnercie.l. banks to keep 
reserves against their deposits? Reserve requirements tor cammercinl 
bnnks are thought to serve three tunctions: they provide tor e. base 
ot support tor monete.ry control, they obtain some degree of primary 
liquidity, and they provide balances tor temporary clearing drains or 
withdravals by depositors. A fairly strong argument cnn be presented 
against the liquidity basis for establishing legal reserves. These 
points might be Inlld.e : 
(l) Banks usually bnve facilities for borrowing to meet 
emergencies. 
(2) By using legal reserves to .meet emergencies, banks violate 
the legal requirements, incur penalties, and establish <.m 
untavorable record 1n the eyes of the supervisory authorities. 
(3) Most banks have other assets readily conva~ible to cash 
which-•tbough not countable as legal reservea--nevertheless 
act as a backstop tor emergencies. 
(4) The American Bankers Association, the United States Congress 
and the Federal Reserve System have all taken the position 
that liquidity 1s ot minor importance in establishing the 
' ' 
' ', . ' . 
need for legnl reserves. 
1 
(5) In the event ot a bank's tailing, legal. reserves vould not 
satisfy o.ll the depositorsJ Federal deposit 1.nSurance would 
have the.burden ot protecting them anyway. 
2 
(6) Good bsnk supervision is a more 1ogicaJ. menna to assure adequate 
liquidity 1n caimnercial bs.nke. 
An opposing but somewhat weaker argument vill properly state 
· that banks which are 1n danger of faUing to JD.eet depositor demands w111, 
:f'irst tail to maintain legnl. reserves. Thus the supervieor,y authorities 
· can be alerted to take actions as may be necessary to ess111t the bank to ' 
avurt the danger. 
Do bnnk.S bave to maintain legal reserves to pr<wide the Federal 
monetar:r a.u:tbority with the means tor monete.r;y control? In other words, 
do legal. reserves exist to limit or expand camaercial. be.Dk&' abilities 
to create money so. that by cba.ng1ng reQ.uiremants; a desired change 1n 
the money supply may be brought about?. 
Let us suppose tbat a lO per cent reserve requirement prevnils 
constantly 1n a JllC>del. banking system. Al.Bo assume that all be.nks have 
onl,y three accounts; reserves--10 per cent ot deposits, loens--90 per 
. . 
cent ot deposits, and d.ep0s1t&••l00 per cent.· If .the monetary authority 
now 1nJecta newt bank reserves into the system by purchase ot open market 
securities, banks may expand. loans by ten times the amount of new 
reserves. But suppose the injection of nev reserves is unintentional., 
say, by reason of' a greater portion ot uncollected checks in the hands 
ot the central bank••checks drawn upon, but not yet presented to, the 
blU'lks we have been discussing--or maybe an 1nf lov of gold from foreign 
countries. Now the central bank or monetary authority must take 
"def'ensivea action through the purchase of' securities in the open 
3 
market to ottset the unwrmted reserve ettects. What it' tbe "defensive" 
action isn't enough to otfset tbo unwanted effects on bank reserves? 
What it the ''defell8ive" action is too VigorousJ that 1o1 what happens 
U' the monetary authority misJud§es the degree of the Job to be done? 
Then we obtain more or lesa bank reserves in our model system than we. 
wish to have. The real rub is that we permit or cause our loans to 
expend. or contract in amounts ten times the magnitude ot the misJud.gement. 
Now assume that ill8tead ot a lO per oent prevailing reserve requirement 
we have a 20 per cent requirement. Under these conditions ve bnve assumed, 
the banks can only expand or contract loans by five times the excess or 
deficient reserve figure. Hence the monetary power has less leverage 
but the unfavorable effects ot its misjudgements are lessened. 
The Economic Policy Commission of the American 13ankers Associ-
ation issued a report 111 1957 entitled ¥.ember Ba.Dk Reserves vbich included 
this statement: 
"Under our system, control over bank reserves is exerted 
primarily through discount end open market opei·ations. legal. 
reserve requ.irements may be tbousbt ot as providing a tixed 
fulcrum on which these credit-control levers rest. 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Federal Reserve policy could not effectively regulate the 
volume ot bank lending and :lnve&ting unless tbe bankers were 
to adhere rigidly to sane unwritten rules with respect to 
their cash ratioB••a condition which would not be likely to 
be fulfilled in practice. '' 
A 
The above raison d'etre does not apply, however, vi.th equal 
force througtlout our b~ng society, and there :ia soma suspicion that 
~ . 
reserve requirements do not really serve as o.n effective monetary control 
tool at all. Sane points along these lines are: 
(l) Nomnember banks' abilities to create money are not directl.y 
affected by Federal Reserve monetary controls. 
(2) Many small member banks customarily carry excess reserves and 
thus are not immediately affected by Federal Rese1"Ve action to 
restrict or encourage bunk lending p:>wers. 
(3) Muny other small ond moderate-sized banks, Nhile affected, are 
not important generators of money and credit since their loans 
and investments are governed more by local factors thun by 
the money markets or by the business cycle. While a shift in 
these bu.nks' portfolios into or out of government securities 
can be discerned over a period. of time, neither cost nor 
avciila.billty of' credit in the money murket has great import 
to the moderate-sized bank. in the short run. 
(4) Reserve requirements have not been changed in an upward 
direction at any time during the past twelve years despite 
three.identifiable nation.al business cycles und a fairly 
steEi.dy upward change in the general price level. Couldn't 
this be interpreted as proof that reserve requirements aren't 
really u tool tor monetary control? 
In the concluding section ot this paper, the question of' 
whether reserve requirements are needed will again be raised. In the 
meantime assumption is made that bank reserves ~ provide a measure ot 
liquidity; and, much more important, they ~ serve as u base against 
which mane.geab1e e:f'f eats on the money supply can be brought about through 
general controls on bunk cred.1 t. These two purposes a.re the ones chiefly 
considered. However, it must be borne in mind that legal reserves with 
the central bank serve a valuuble clearing function also, end the central 
bank with its immense check processing facilities bas greatly contributed 
to the payments mechanism in the United States, benefitting the public. 
5 
Nature of Bank Reserves 
\.'' 
.An e..xaminution of present legal reserve requirements against 
.. ' . ' 
commercial bunks, a brief l.ook at Federal Reserie member bunk require• 
)\. 
'' 
ments over the years, and a restatement of def'1nit1on might be helpful • 
. ! 1-' ·: .. ; 
Bank reserves are primary reserves it they consist of eush or balance 
due from other banks eubJect to immediate witbd.rnwal. Bnnk. reserves are 
' ' ' 
secondary reserves if they consist of short-term liquid essets. Most 
ot the legal requirements :imp)sed on banks perta1n:to primary reserves. 
. . ' 
Federal Reserve member brJ.llka, for example, are required to maintain a 
m:lnimum amount ot cash in vuult )?lua collected balance, due trom a Federal 
., c 
Reserve bank. Many state chartered nonmember banks muy ~onsider balances 
due from correspondent banks as legal reserves. Some may consider 
' ' 
• ' i ' 
secondary.reserves such ae United Stetes Treasury Bills as legal reserve. 
" I ·• 
,· . ',' l ' •' . 
Tables l nnd. 2 indicate present requirements for stute cburtcred non-
.' .. i 
member baDldng 1nst1 tut1ona. Table 3 ehovs member bank reserve require-
(:'~: ',;: :.: : 
". I 
ments .f~ 1917 'ttO the present. 
I 
1 
i Cnlls For Changes In legal Reserves 
.j 'The foregoing discussion is intended to provide sane per-
, 
spective. tor; the etibject matter ot this papor ~- · We a.re ma1nly concerned 
• .. : .-. t - ~ 
·J~ ' ' ,. '. ' -i : • 
here llith the kind ot legal reserve ·requirements needed in the United 
. '___....... . 
(; 
~ ' ... ·. ': . . ' . ; 
StateS.tOday •. Jfuile tll1s paper de'als with mechanics more than with 
•' • ' : - >':: -~ ' , ., ' . ' ~ ' ' 
macreeco~c ·~ttsdt~'or va.r:ioUs proposal.~~ the real test of lo.vs ·dealing 
;.J:.,, ,• _, ·, ~ ·:. r:c.~,,·tr,~-·· ' , . "' . ·: · L •,, -· !.' • 
with our financial institutions seems to be whether a law contributes 
to the economic growth and well being of the whole society. This paper, 
lika others vr1tten on the subject of reserve requirements in commercial 
. 
banking, considers nn abundance of mechanical. det!iil and is especiall.y 
occupied with competitive relationships. 
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lB l 15 
0 
20 0 
16.5 0 
16.5 5 0 
11 5 0 
lB 
' 
0 
20 5 2.5 
0 
9 0 l/ 1 0 
" A'' 0 1/ 1 0 ' .5 0 - .Ji5 2.55 0 
12.5 0 0 5 0 
6.67 0 l 2 0 
6 6 0 0 0 
15 Q 0 5 0 
25 0 0 10 0 
11 0 l 0 0 
9 0 3 0 0 
15 0 0 l~ 0 16 li 0 l 
16.5 0 0 0 
16.5 0 0 
' 
0 
11 0 0 ,. 0 
18 0 0 5 0 
17.5 0 i.25 3"'15 0 
13.33 6.67 0 l),33 6.67 
• In moat cuea the percente.ac requiromenta abovn are preacr1bed in the Sta.to lav lteelt. Where the law empower• banking autborltl•• to obcmae 1'9Hl"Y• 
requirementa, Uta percentage• abawn are tboao whiab were actuall)" 1n eftoctJ the Jllnt.mum Ql'ld lb&Ximwll reurva percontasoa vhich 11111 M preaorlb&d 1n tbo9e 
St&tH are •bown 1n M10tbor table. 
ff The "'"'"" requ1remonta ebow 111 the °'TlJld depod ts• oolU111111 tor Calitornta, .ll&BBacb1111etto, Jf•braalc&, and Uto!J appJ¥ on.!¥ to ,.v1np dopo11t1 or to 
depooito in the aavinga departmento or •t1111l"rcial bank• and tn111t cC111panl01, Otller tl.Jlle depooito arc 111~J•ct to different roqui ...... nt1, INt 111 theH 
State• aucb depoait• 1n State cc.nercial bani<• an4 truot companiu are relatively &lllBll in cooi;parloon Y1tll depo11t1 in tboir uvlnp dlpal'tMnt1. 
-•clll'itiea oligil>lo •• reaerves are United Statoo aovomment obligatlon1 and, in sQlllO Ste.too, SW.to o.nd mw>icipal obliptiono. 
]} lither vault caeb or deJland. depo11t1 Vitb tho Federal fteoorve !lank ot San Francioco, 
JO"re: ID Stai.a not lletod 1n thlo S•ation or in thil ncte, the reo•rv• requiremante Sholm in Section A are oppllcablo to all State •-rcial banll Ul4 
-tru.et aanpe.niea. Tho r"'quirementa ahown in this Seation appl7 to. 'btvlke designated. or approved. a1 roeerv• dopo1itori11, b&nka in central na•rv• or 
reserve citiea, bank• in apecitied c1ties, and be.nka in citlaa v1th apac1t1ed. population, aa tollav11 
ArkanBas • 2'11i• 20 poi- cent requtreaent appJ.1e• to bank• 4os1snated aa rooerve agent•. 
Calitomla - 'l'be requ1rement1 sbow above app~ only to reserve depositories. For bank• that are not reserve dlpoe1tor111, looatad in pl.acao Vitb 
population of 50,000 or more, tho requireJ11&nt1 are the • .,.. ao abown above UD•pt that the vault caell requirement 11 only 6 per cent an4 
the portion vhicb DJAy be carried Vith depository bank• U correspon41ngly larger, ror banl<o that are not reoorvo d.epolltor1eo, l.ccaad 
1n plac•• vltb population under 50,000 oee section A· 
12!!! - Tllo requirements apply to b&nke in reoerve ciUeo (de1!1P>&t•d •• •uob under tho Federal llH•rv• Act)• 
Konaaa - A 20 per cent reeerve ii roquired a~tnat demn4 depooita duo to b&nk•J the 12.5 per cent requirement applloo to otb .. di- depoolto, 
Kentucky - Tbe 10 per cent r•qlliremont on demand depo11ta eppl1ea to bank• in reeervo cltlo•. There 11 • 13 per oont requi....,nt ap.inot dlMllcl 
depoaita tor central reserve city bank.a, but thore 11 no central reaervo c1t1' in th.e State. 
Minne•ota - Tbe requiremento appl1 to 'b&nk.a in reserve cities (deai~ted· 0.1 aucb wider the redaral. Re11rv1 Act). 
~:ppi • The requirements applf to bank.a iu places with population over 50,000, 
 - Tho requirement 11pplie1 to bank.a approved. aa reserve dt1poeitor1ea. 
liebra•ka - The requil'e»Dta app~ to bonito in citi•• with population of ~.ooo or more, 
Okla™- - !be requil'e»nta apply to approved dopoaitoriee. 
~bl requirement& npply to bani<• ill places vttb pop.tlation or 50,000 or..,,.., 
- ~ requirement appl1fH to ba.nU 4&dgna.tod. aa naerve depol1to:r1e•. 
Source: Legal Division, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. 
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'tABli! 2 
!\ASIC tl'tA'IVl'Ul<f Hl!Si:l!V~ RB(jJIRl>lillT'J, J\C'l'llAL l<l'~J Cit JAllllAllf l, J.962, 
#JjJ) KDIDIUll AllD MAXDllll l<E~l/IIO»ll:!NT'1 PRL!Selllll':D "r &'TA'l'I! !All, FOR ~'.£AT£ CCJo!MERCIAL BA1W1 AllD TRUST C(J(l>AJllES 
IM llTA1'1!::1 Ill 1/KICH llAHKlHG Alll'HOIUTlt:J Al<E >;j.lp()\li:l!ED TO CHA!iCE 111'!Sl.:RV~ 11£QUllWolilfrS 
State P~r cent ot demand deposlt~ Per c"'nt ot tiJU de.PJ11ta 
B46iC Actuul Minhuw Maxillnw B411C Actunl M1ni&\ll 
l.labaaa 1/ 
" 
l 
Ari•ooa - 10 10 10 20 5 5 5 Ananaaa~/ J./ 15 15 15 FR 15 15 15 
C&l1tom1.&1 
Bw>U ill plac•• 1t1tl\ popW.at1Qn ot --
100 ,ooo or acre 18 18 w FR 5 5 5 
50. 000 to 100,000 "' 15 15 15 FR 5 5 5 
Eleevhefe - l2 l2 l2 FR 5 5 
' CODDecticut !}./ l2 l2 12 21' 0 0 0 Do la ware 7 ll 7 FR 3 5 3 
D1.otr1ot ot Colml>ta FR 16.5 FR FR FR 5 .!'R 
ICent,.,qi 
lloHl"ff a1t1•• §I 10 10 10 20 3 3 3 
ElatllboN§/ 7 7 7 2• ·3 3 3 11&1,,. 15 ll .. FR 0 5 0 
llary;ian4 
11&11acbuaetta !}./: 15 
15 15 30 rR 3 
' 
3 
Boeta> 20 20 
* * 
0 0 0 
JlHVbere l5 15 * • 0 0 0 111cla18111 2/ l2 12 l2 2.t. l2 l2 l2 
JliDDHOtl- l2 l2 l2 FR 5 5 5 
··-
10 l2 10 5 6 5 
lev RaapolaiN 15 15 
* 
FR 15 15 11 l5 
•n Jeney 15 l2 15 30 .!'R 3 5 3 
lev Meld.co 2/ l2 l2 l2 15 l2 l2 12 
lev tori<: -
-ttl:I Bol'O\lsl>, dawtow ..... 10 16.5 10 .!'R 
* 5 0 
-ttl:I Botougb, \llltollll ...... 10 26.5 10 FR 
* 
' 
0 
-111> and. ll1'0llX Bol'OUl!)a 10 ll lO FR • ii 0 
MfUo lO 16.5 lO FR 
* 
5 0 
JlHVbel'e 7 ll 7 FR 
* 
5 0 
llOrtll Do.kota lO 10 10 20 5 
' 
5 
Olaio 15 15 .. • 10 10 * ONP>n 15 ~' l2 30 5 ~ ' felllll;rlY&llia 15 • 30 7.5 • Uta:ll 
Larp a1 tiH 8/ 20 20 20 
"° 
5 5 
' Slllewl>U'e - 15 15 15 30 
' 
5 
' Ye.-it 15 30 9 30 3 6 2 
ll<>ae e:pea1tie4 ill tbo lav. 
}) 'llMt prov111on tor cllan&e• 1ll reoervo requi~nt• by the State Banking Board applioo onl.;r to t""" 4epo1it1. 
!/ Ill .t.z!wLl&a, K1cb1pn, and. ••v Mexico, i4ent1cal roq\11,,....nto apply io demand and. time depooita. Jlow...,r, in 111cblpn tho entire 
n11rn OA tiM de~ait1 JDa¥ aonaiat of Unl'ted Ste.tea Qovernm.ent eecuritiee. 
Max!Jaula 
5 
10 
.!'R 
.!'R 
.!'R 
FR 
0 
FR 
FR 
6 
6 
FR 
6FR 
0 
0 
2i. 
FR 
* J/ 15 
6 rR 
15 
rR 
n 
FR 
rR 
FR 
10 
• 
l.O 
15 
lO 
l.O 
e 
~ 1e1tbor the•• percentapa nor the authortt7 to change requircmanta extend.s to banka deaisn&ted aa reaerve agents. TM reqW.reaentm tor auch 
-. ii 20 JMlr cont ap.inlt demand. ond tima d.epoalt•. 
~/ !be roiiUiruonta appl.;r al10 to bo.nka tbat are reserve ciepos1torie• J.oc•<ed in pl•••• vitb population Wider 50,000. 
21 Jlec&ua• all but a relative}¥ aiaU p>rtion o.f total ti..m.e deposit& ()f Coruiectl.cut trwat comp.t.niea conaiat ot depoait• in aavings c1~partmente 
and. 1A the cue of Maa•achuaetta tnuit canpan1cs,~ ot aav1ng& d.epoBit1;, t.ht! zero figu.rea tor these Statee refer to 1uch depoaita, which cbt· 
poait.a are exempted b1' statute frca ·rcseaw1: requireme11t11. Howev<:r, 1rl CoMecticut an u.ctUQ.l. re-q\lirement ul 5 pc.i:· cent., vi th u ~maios1Lle 
n.nge of f1'0ll S to lO per cent, ta applitable to ti.mo depo15its in the coait1K!rCi&.l deport.merit, wa<1 in MQ.l'ISIM!b~el..ta tho d.elaand dtiposit. rt:quire .. 
Miit apPliH to certlin ti... 4epoo1 ta 1n tAo ca.ere I.al deJl"rboent. 
§I TbAt state lav preeoribe1 hieher nrquirw,etnta ror banks Jn central Z'tl'aerv~ c1t1ea, but there are no •uch c1t1ea tn UMt St.Ate. 
11 !"be ranae of reserve requinMnta on t1M d.epoait1 in tho carmerc.lu.l dbplrtaieut la tram 5 per cent t.o the Federal Reserve auhlull., Wt tlw 
re•em require.ant en depo1tta' tn aa.v1nr;1 cteprtmenta ot ccmnerc181 bani.a la the •a.me as fixed. tor eavlnga bank1, namel.t, 15 per ae'nt, and 
tAe 1"818"9 •1 conallt ot cash, 'b&l&licoa In other b&iiks, or obl16flt1.una ot t.he Un1te4 States. 
!/ JallU ill citiH vitb & pop\llat1on at 501000 ur ""''". 
IO'l'lh In Florida (not liated al>ove) tbe lav provid.oi tlat tho Comptroller '1A1 tl'Qa time to tiae toftllllate and pl'Ollllllpto roaaonablo l'lll•• and 
Ngulationo ·govenilns t.bo conduct ors*'~ banlr.o, \lhicll aball bavo tho force and. ertect ot lav, and. be •ball bave paver to enforce tha ..... 
'1'bU &lltlK>rit;r baa ,..,...,, been uoecl by l.llo•C011ptroll1r to increase or lover bo.nlt roaorve roq\liruenta. 
Source: Legal Division, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. 
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Effective date 
TABLE 3 
MEMBER BANK RESERVE REQUIREMENTS 
(Per cent of deposits) 
Net demand deposits l Tirno deposits 
Central Reserve 
reserve city banks 
city banks 2 
Country 
banks 
Central 
reserve and 
reserve city 
bankJ 2 
Country 
banks 
1917-Junc 21..... ••• ••••• 13 10 7 3 3 
1936-Aug. 16............. 19~ IS 10~ 4~ 4~ 
1937-Mar. 1........ •• ••• 22~ 17~ 12~ s~ s~ 
May l............. 26 20 14 6 6 
1938-Apr. 16............. 22~ . 17~ 12 S S 
1941-Nov. 1............. 26 20 14 6 6 
1942-Aug. 20............. 24 ••••••••••••.•••.••••••••••••.••••.•••••••••• , •• 
Sept, 14 ....... ,..... 22 , .................... , ••.••.•.••••.•.•••••.••••• 
Oct. 3............. 20 •••••••••••• •••••·••··•• ·••····•·••· ........... . 1948-Feb. 27. • • • . • .. • • • • . 22 , •.•..•.•• , • • • • • • • • • . • • • . . • • • . . . • • . • • •• , ••. , • , •• 
Juno 11.. •••• •••• ••• 24 ............................................... . 
Sept. 16 •••••••••••••••••••••• ~.. ..... • .. •.•• 16 •••• •.•• •••• 7~ 
24............. 26 22 • • • • • . • • • • • • 7~ •••••.•••••• 
1949--May 1. . . . . . . . . . . . . . • • • . . • . • • • . .. . . . . . . . . . . lS . . 7 s............. 24 21 .••••••••••• ···r····· ........... . 
Juno 30 •••••••••••••••••.•• , • • • • 20 • • • • • • • • • • • • 6 .••••••••••• 
July 1. ..........•. ·••·•···•••· ······.... .. 14 ......... •• • 6 Aug. 1............. ............ ............ 13 ....................... . 
11............. 23~ 19~ • • • • • • • • • • • • s .•..•..••••• 
16 ......................... ••••·. ...... 12 •••• ••• •• ••• s 
18............. 23 19 ................................... . 
25............. 22~ 18~ •••••••••••• •••••••••••• •••••••••••• 
m1J:E.t.1L::::::::::: ~~ rn ············ ·····;;······ ············ 
16 •••...••••••.•••••••••••••••......••. ····ir····· ............ ·····;;······ 
Feb. 21::::::::::::: .... ~ .......... ~~ .......... ir····· :::::::::::: :::::::::::: 
19.53-July l. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 • • • • • • • • • • • • • ••••••••••• 
9.... .• ••• . ••• . 22 19 •••••••••••••.••••••••...••.•••••••• 
19.54-June 16 •.••••..•••••••••..•••• , ............. , ....... , ••.•••.• , . • • • • . .5 24........... .. 21 . • . . . . • • • . . • • • • • • • • • • • • • s ........... . 
July 29............. 20 18 •••••.•••••.•••••••••••••••••••••••• 
Aug. l. ................................. , . . 12 ••••••••••••.••••••••••• 
1958-Feb. 27...... •. • . • •• 19~ 17~ ................................... . 
Mar. !............. ............ ............ 11* ............ •••••••••••• 20........... .. 19 17 ••••..•••••••••••••••••.•••••••••••• 
Apr. J:::::::::::: ····is~·· .. :::::::::::: .... ~~ ....... :::::::::::::::::::::::: 24.. ...... ... .. 18 16~ •••••••••••• ••••••••••• .•••••••••••• 
· 1960-Sept. l............. 17~ .••....••••.•••••.•••••••••••••••••.•••••••••••• 
Nov. 24............. ............ ............ 12 •••••••••••••••••••••••• 
t96i-E~: '1::::::::::::: .... ~~~ .... :::::::::::: :::::::::::: ·····.r····· :::::::::::: 
Nov. 1............. ............ ............ ............ ............ 4 
In effect Jan. 1, 1963........ • • • • • • • • • • • • 16~ 12 4 4 
Prcs~n~ legal requirements: 
MID1Il1um. •• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • J 10 7 
14 
3 
6 
3 
6 Maximum..... • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • . J 22 
1 Demand deposits subject to reserve requirements which, beginning with Aug. 23, 193S, have 
been total demand deposits minus cash items m process of collection and demand balances due from 
domestic bankJ (also minus war loan and Series B bond accounts during the period Apr. 13, 1943-
June 30, 1947). 
2 Authonty of the Board of Governors to classify or reclassify cities as central reserve cities was 
terminated effective July 28, 1962. 
3 From Aug. 23, 1935, to July 28, 1959, the minimum and maximum legal requirements agaipst 
net demand deposits of central reserve city banks were 13 and 26 per cent, respectively, and the maxi· 
mum for reserve city banks was 20 per cent. 
N(JJ11.-A11 required reserves were held on deposit with Federal Reserve Banks June 21, 1917, 
until late 1959. Since then, member banks have also been allowed to count vault cash as reserves, as 
follows: Country banks-in excess oC4 and 2~ per cent of net demand deposits effective Dec. 11 1959, 
and Aug. 2!1, 1960, l'CSl>CCtively. Central reserve city and reserve city banks-in excess of 2 ana 1 per 
cent effective Dec. 3, 19.59, and Sept. 1, 1960, respectively, Effective Nov. 24, 1960, all vault cash. 
Source: Forty-ninth Annual Report of the Board of Governors of 
the Federal Reserve System, l962, p. l6l. 
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What level and structure or reserves held by f inanciul insti-
tutions will otter the optimum incentive to f'ull employment of .the nation's 
resources, price stability, and secular growth? Ro one bes really answered 
this question. Bovever, most knowledgeable, interested persons wbC> hnve 
addressed their attention to the proper role r!lld structure of commercinl. 
bunk reserve requirements have concluded that present day requiremnts 
are not what they should be. Apparently' it is widel.y felt that the present 
form ot requirements exists largely because ot historical considerations 
which no J.onger apply to our money end banking society. 
The American Bankers Aesoc1ntion (1957), :the Commission on 
Money and Credit (1961), the Advisory C01Jlllittee on :Banking 01' the Comp-
troller ot the Currency (1962), and the President's Committee on Financial 
Institutions (1963), have all called tor drastic change in the structure 
ot l.egal reserve requirements. Interestingly, there is·very little 
evidence presented 1n all this wrk that legal reserve requirements are 
necessary at all. · At least there is 11 ttle e.ttemt)t to ·provide such · 
evidence. Al1 ot these studies have resulted in e call tor more uni• 
formity in legal. reserves .J· Al1 but the .American Bank.era Association 
atUCQ' recomnend. that all Federally•insured commercial banks be subJect 
to Federal requirements. All the studies have denounced the present 
geographical basis for establishing reserves for member banks. 
Legal reserves ot financial inatitutions are considerably more 
1mp0rtant than.would be supposed by laymen unexJJOsed to :f'undsmente.l 
u:Jney.and be.nking theory. 'l'heya:f'f'ect our economic growth, they e.ttect 
government revenue, they a.treat the growth1 ·earnings and safety ot the 
lOnly' about 18 per cent of state-chartered banks I>resent~· 
be1ong to the Federal Reserve System. 
ll 
1natitut1ons subjected to reserve requirements. Unfortunatol.y, changes 
1n lego.l. reserves o.f.fect competitive positions so comprehensively tha.t 
1t is very dif:ficult to avoid suspicion that this or t.bnt viewpoint io 
ent1rel.y objective. It is al.so difficult to advance one's own viewpoint 
Without (l) adhering to e. traditionuJ. concept which would be contrary 
to economic progress or (2) calling tor a drt..st1c cnanse which might 
bring financial. hard.ship or even ruination to large classes of inSti-
tutions. Supply ot over•all money and credit 1D the United States ho.a 
come to be a 11publlc 11 tunctionj however, the ownership of the l.Dlderlying 
capital which makes this possible ia private. f:Eii. change vill benetit•-
or hurt--aome m:>re than others. Tbe question of change therefore 
inV'Ol.ves degree 'BS much as substance, am e. step by step approach may 
be the best yq out of the Jungle of the varying reserve requirements 
vhich apply todey in this coUlltry. The Heller report in 1 ts advocacy ·· 
ot graduated reserve requirements based upon a·camnercial bank's size, 
evidently- enviSions this procedure a.a e. stepping atone e.nd. not e. perma-
nent aoJ.ution to the problem presented by the morass ot Federal. and state 
laws which are themse1ves products of imperfect evolution tram the days 
at the liquidity reserve. 
Scope of the Paper 
The principal aim ot this paper is to.present ell the recent 
proposals tor changes in commerc1a1 reserve requirements, which are 
conveniently quoted and described in one place• 'The evaluations provided 
herein are necessarily vulnerable and rather cursory.· -The supposed 
e:t.f'ects of adopting such changes cannot be based upon mathematical 
certainties or past statistical evidence. Furthermore, the side issues 
l2 
or related topics such as competitive relationships among the f'inencial 
institutions, Federal supervision .. Federal deposit insurance, role of' 
the central. bank, or the open market mechanism for credit control can 
only be mentioned here and there when it appears these considerations 
belong with bank reserve considerations. Tbe side issues are not 
primarily important in this pa.per. These things are clearly related 
to.a~ consideration ot what commercial bank legal reserves should beJ 
the;y are timel;y and interesting subjects, but there is not capacity to 
treat them here. 
One cannot begin really to disentangle the complicated s;ystem 
ot bo.nk reserve requirements without a thorough understanding ot how the 
various requirements and mechs.nics for maintenance of legal reserves crune 
to their present state. Thia .. however, is not en historical. account. 
The student of money- and bnnk1ng is fully supplied with economic h1ator;y 
1n his unde;-graduate studies and texts. What is attempted here is a 
kind ot editorial report on current proposals. Undoubtedly there will 
be revisions in our banking lava. Little improvement can be eccamplisbed, 
however, unless this segment of private enterprise can recognize what 
are its own shortcomings and which of the le.we under which it operates 
are unaatietactory., Then it must interest the public in an up-to-date 
bsnldng system. Since the general public J.ncka sufficient educational 
background to cope with money end banking probl.ems, the benldng community 
probo.bly' must do the Job of correcting any faulty legislation. 
There are three original end compl.ete sets of current proposals 
tor changes in reserve requirements. These ere the .American Benker• 
Association plan (1957), the Commission on Maney- and Credit recamnen-
dation (1961) .. and the President's Committee on Financial Institutions 
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or the Heller recommendations (1963). These vill be quoted, described, 
W1d evaluated 1n V8.r"'Jing degrees. Their ovaluation will consist of con-
sidering their ei"f'eativeness (in corre~ting 1.nequitias or def'iciencies 
in present .la:i1s), their admin.1str.:itivc effects (as to the central bank 
as wll as to the commercial. bunks), and their structural eftecta 
(changes in organization of the con:raeroia.l. banking system). There is 
som duplication and overlapping of proposals anxmg the results of the 
three study groups •. :Although each group 1 a recommendations vh1ah pertain 
to reserve requiremants will be tully quoted7 repatit1oua discussion is 
avoided. For example, tha.Beller report (and this paper•-in discussing 
it) deal.a 'With reserves against time deposits, and so does the ABfl. plan. 
Hovever, little is snid regarding this wxier:the AliA section. · Thia 
procedure ia explained approprie.tel.y in each chapter • 
. A·· retort made · in .l.962 by the .Ad,visoey Cammi ttee ot the Canp. · 
troller ot the Currency entitled National Banks and the Future, better 
known as the Saxon report, included recommendations substantially equ.U 
to those oontained in the earlier AM plan. Chapter IV is quite brief 
tor these reasons• · 
· . There is a proposal described. in Cha:pter Vll tor changes in 
the reserve settlement per10ds (March, 1964)• This appears to be quite 
interesting aime it involves correction of s mechanical deficiency in 
the present reserV"e requirement system. Thie apparent deficiency baa 
existed tor nearly 50 yeara,·almost unnoticed.J yet the mnr proposal 
would•·in the eyes ot its authors••facilita.ta a substantial. improvement 
in administration. It is the most· current ot the proposals here discussed, 
having been acquired trom its authors tor this pa.per prior to its publi• 
cation in the March 1961~ issue of the Journal of Finance. · 
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Another unpublisbed paper concermng atatiatical anaJ.yaiS ot 
the e.tteots ·~ tmt li!ller reca.mnMldations on V'arious clasees ot tmite4 
States cammercie.J. banks is the baais tor Chapter Vl11 . 'rhia·1nsp1l'ed 
tbiS writer to a brief further anal.ysis of ettects ot the CMC recom-
mendntions upon the various classes ot bank.tit There. ttre also included 
1D Chapter VI the supposed effects.of the Beller and CMC Pl'QpoSala upon. 
Virg1n1a bank.a gt"Oupcd. into size clnseiticatione. 
Chapter II deals ·Jith the liBA· ~e.n. While v18h1ng to acrupu-
lOusly avoid an· historical and doctrinal approach in writing thie paper, 
it seems necessnr,y to discuss the events surroundi.tl8 the 1959 Con-
gressional .Amecdments to Section 19 to the Federal Reserve Act• Since 
these cha.ngea in law folloved end largely result from aot1v1 ties ot tho 
MJA1 it seems appropriate to begin Cbe.pter II with soma discussion about 
the net borrowed reserve p0sit1onS in which banke .found tbemaelvee during 
tho l.950 .. 1959 period and which princit:;o.l.ly gave·riso.to the JiJ3A activity. 
It al.so gives us an opportunity to examine some current factors affecting 
resel"Vt3.B1 o.nd. see hov the central banlt in this ·instance went about 
changing tbs structure ot legal reserves ao delicately as to preserve 
W1·ord.erly- supply ot 11Yl1Jl!Y e.nd. lend sta.bil1ty to existirJg competitive 
relationships. We will wish to both describe the ~ plan end review 
the l.959 emendments. An evaluation Vill be chiefly directed ·toward 
tvo ideas expressed 1n thia study: (l) !rbe· claas1ficat1on of banks tor 
renerve pul'}X)Ses should.be abol.1shed1 am (2) a substantia.l reduction 
in legal reserve requirements should take place. The chapter closes 
'. ' 
with u little discussion of ''vhat level reserve requirements should be." 
The recommendations of the Commission on Money and Credit are 
.the sUbJect of Chapter m. In this chapter there are three principal 
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ideas examtneds (l) cban8es in reserve requirements Should be used. 
8paringl;y1 (2) universal membership in the Federal Reserve System should 
be required ot all acmml$rc1al bunks, and (3) the time deposit reserve 
requirement shoUld be repealed. 
Chapter V deals with the Heller re{Ort ot April, 1963· This 
report--with the greatest amount ot sup:port tram nll interested Be81llents 
ot the Federa1 government and perhaps representing the most practical 
approach to com:nercial bunk reserve requirements--hae bad the least 
attention of e.ll the sets of proposal.a. It we.a u conviction tha.t the 
Heller report deserved far more attention than it appears to have 
received that caused the writing of this paper. It seems a.lJllost incom-
prehensible that all the concemed. government agency heads could agree 
on a need tor extending uniform reserve requirements to all canmercial 
banks, o. conclusion reached by a distinguished·committee of industrial, 
financial, and labor leaders three ye.-:,xs ea.r lier, and yet the. t after 
nearly a year, not one bill has been introduced in the Congress concerned 
with this prop:>sal or any other from the Heller report.l Chapter V 1e 
e.ddreased to (1) voJ.untary membership coupled with uniform requiremf!nts, 
(2) graduated reserve requirements, (3) extension of unif'orm time deposit 
reserve requirements to other savings institutions end the effect on 
commercial banks. 
Together, Chapters II, III, and V torm the basis for writing 
this thesis: a statement and brief' evaJ.uation ot current and recent 
1we t1nd Congress in early 1964 concerned With hearings on 
appropriateness of ownership ot capitol. stock certU'1cates in the Federal 
Reserve Banks, audits of the Reserve Banke by the Ge:neral Accounting 
of'fice, and proper size c.nd organization of the Open Market Committee, 
among other things. 
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proposals for changes in reserve requirements. This is written with the 
tbousht that too little has been said on the subject. 
Chapter VnI concludes w1 th the outlook tor chnnges and a 
question: Do these proposals go tar enough? 
CHAPI'ER II 
THE AMERICPli B/lliKERS .ASSOCIATION PLAli 
The Plan Described 
The plan of the Economic fQlicy Commission of the American 
Bankers Association which vas published in 195& aimed ut reserve 
reduction and reform, may not seem after seven years to qu.olif y as a 
current plan. On the other hand the principal uim, substantial reduc-
tion in required reserve ratios, bas not yet been put into effect. 
Therefore, the fJ3.A objectives are still in a sense current. Further, 
the Report of the Advisory Committee of the Comptroller of the Currency 
(1962) revealed the continuing diese.tisfaction of the banking community 
with the 1959 changes in law. This report substuntially repeated some 
of the A'£A suggestions. 
The proposed program of the ABA will be discussed princip:;i.lly 
in terms of the general idees tb&t reserve requirements on net demand 
deposits are too high and that geographical considerations a.re no 
longer appropriate. The question of legal reserves on time deposits 
is discussed under the Commission on Money c.nd Credit and the Heller 
report sections.1 The vault cash proposal has been written into lav. 
'· lAlthough time deposit reserve discussion is deferred.; 1t is 
interesting to note that the Af3A recommended in 1957 e. "nominal reserve 
ot two per cent'' against time deposits, in the event vault cash were to 
·, 
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···The ABA pl.en recommended the following: 
(l) · Event'Ullll.y' reduce reserve reqUiremerits· for demand de]?Osita to 
10 per cent. 
(2) Authorize the Federal Reserve to vary the resertle reqUirement 
tor demand deposits betveen 8 and l2 per cent. 
(3) · El1m1ns.te geograph1cal.d1f'ferences in reserve requirements for 
· demalld deposits. '· 
( 4) Eventually reduae the reserve requirement tor time deposits to 
2 per cent. 
(5) Permit the inclusion ot vault cash 1ri legal reserves. 
Our intent e.t this point is to consider .the above proJ)osala in 
the light of ''tree reserve" conditions which prevailed 1n the latter · 
part ot the 1950'&; the changes in la'W' whioh were made in 1959, snd the 
situation which now prevails.· The evaluation of the.uniformity ot 
cle.ssitication ot member banks.and the substantial reduction ideas-will 
follow •. The chapter will conclude with some discussion ot ho-# -one may 
arrive at an appropriate level ot resel"V'e reqUirements. 
From 1917 to 1936 reserve requirements on demand deposits were 
respectively' 13 _per cent,· ·10 per cent, 8nd 7 i:ier cent tor central reserve 
city, reserve city, and country bank&. A three per cent requirement 
obtained on time deposits ot all member bank&. In 1934, tolloidng 
devaluation ot the dollar in terms ot @)ld, huge"intlovs of gold trom 
become part Of legal reserves. It would have been ''illogical," .it was 
argued tor bank8 to count .!!.!! ot their vault aasb as reserve ngainet 
net demand depos1 ts ''including the portion now held to take care ot the 
operating needs ot their savings deposits- • • ".--this would mean that 
banks with savings departments would benefit ·unfairly.''· Since the · 
Saxon re}'Ort in !2.§g recommended complete nbolishment ot reserve 
against time deposits, it is understood that the ABA now agrees with 
this later proposal, however. 
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abroad occurred. Excess bank reserves aoo.red to such l.evels that central. 
bank Policy wa useless as it applied to eata.bllabing appropriate money 
supply levels through affecting bank reservea.l The war,e.nd.postwar 
years were periods ot "controlled'' .. government security prices. 
In the earJ..r f'itties, the central bank was once again in charge 
ot monetary policy tollowing the now tamous Treasury-Federal Reserve 
accord ot 1951•. From 1945 to 19571 commercial bunks increased their 
. ' ... 
loans.by $67 billion and reduced their holdings ot government securities 
by $34 billion. This not only raised loan-deposit ratios ahc.rply" (to . 
the highest level since the early 30 1 s), but also reduced member banks' 
liquidity since .the.·reduct1on in security holdings was chiefly in tbe,. 
short-term governments. Eetween 1946 and 1956, gross nntional product · 
expressed 1n constant 1947 dollars increased 42-per cent. In the srune 
period, bank loans rose almost 250 per cent.2 The rise in demand .. 
deposits ot member ba.nltB was 14 per cent trom mid-1951 to m1d·l957• 
Time deposits increased by 49 per cent in this period.3, How could "the. 
' ' I .. ' 
legal. reserves needed tor the projected continuation ot. this rise 1n. 
deposits be provided?. This was tbo question raised by the PJ3A •. 
Certa1nly an intl<T.t of gold we.a not to. be expected. In order to 
provide the needed reserves through System open market purchases of 
United States sov.ermnent securities, tbe Federal Reserve.would need. 
to expand ~ts holdings by $7 billion 1n the. coming tive years. The 
ltn l.940 member bank&' excess reserves were e.bout 90 per cent 
ot legal requirements. 
2Murray G •. U:le, "Why Reserve Requir~ts S~uld Ee Cut,'' 
Reprinting from J!npkipg, Journal. ot the American 13onkers Association, 
(February, 1958). 
3Ibid. 
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ABA reasoned that this vould put pressure on the Reserve Bank's O'WD gold 
·reserves end eventually impair the independence:ot the System in its 
relationship to the Treasury. ·.Another reason tor not relying on more· 
purchases ot securities by the System was alleged to be that' a further 
:reduction 1n the supply ot liquid assets held bi the private economy 
vould be unvholesome. 
·The plan emphasized the inequities ot the masting system ot 
bank classification according to geographical considerations. This was 
&aid to be based upon an historical accident• : There 'were times in the·· 
early bistocy ot Federal Reserve and before,· when banks in outlying · 
districts kept 11quidity reserves 1n city banks which in turn maintained 
reserves in New York, Chicago, and St. Iouis. The resulting pyramid ot 
reserves called tor more liquidity on the part ot banks ot the apex. 
When the Fed.eraJ. Reserve Syetem·ws established, it wos thOught that 
reserves should be mobilized in the central banks, but the importance 
ot the financial centers iri continuing to o.ttrcct d&positswas recognized. 
Thus, the geographic cluse1tication ot bnnke tor reserve purposes was 
preserved. In later years the distribution wae justified.on grounds ot 
greater velocity of deposits· in large city banks and the greater re-
sponsiveness of·these·banks to credit demands. 
Central reserve city and reserve city banks voul.d'benetit most 
.£rom a.reduction in lege.l reserve requirements against demand deposits 
to the 10 ;per cent level envisaged. _Country banks would gain most from 
the reduction in time deposit requirements and the vault cash allowance, 
since traditionel.l.y they h~ve bad larger proportions ot their assets 
and liabilities in· these :f'orms than bave city banks •. The .A.BA expected 
21 
tbatthe three classes would benetit eq~ in a.general. sense with 
some greater ad.vantage for smaller reserve city bOllks. 
A prompt denmiaiation ot the AB.A plan was forthcoming tram the 
'
1l.OO per centers. •1l. It was pointed out that a $9.8 bill1on. decrease in 
required reserves would have to be ot:f'set by System open market aales 
ot $9.8 b1ll1on since.the DJOnetory authorities could not simply intlato 
the J110ney supply overnight.2 Profeosor ilvin Hansen called this a 
"wind.tall''.. tor commercial. bnnk& sinae they vould.1 in ettect,. be trans• 
torming $9.8 billion in nonearning assets (reserve balances with Federal 
Reserve banks) into earning assets (United States government. securities .· 
rel.eased by the System's open market·account). 
Partial Reform Amid Economic Fluctuation 
'.L'he economic dovnturn ot 1957-1958 caused the monete.r,y authority 
to use its general. powers vigorously to ease credit.. Reserve require• 
menta by 1958 had already been cut aonsiderabl.Y. f'rom the 1953 level. 
Central reserve city requirements hs.d been reduced to. l.8 per. ·cent tram 
24 per cent, reserve city requirements bad been cut to 16-l/2 per cent 
trom 20 per cent 1 aDi country banks legal. resel."V'ea, lowered to ll per cent 
from 14 per cent. Time deposit requirements vere set at 5 per cent tor 
all classes · ot banks 1n 1954.3 The '.American B;,nk.ers Association 1 s 
1A characterization of the nchictigo School" of tbink:Sng which 
suggests el:lm1nating commercial. banking as we knov it by requiring 100 
per cent reserve againat bank depouits,; tbus destroying banks' ability 
to create money (demand deposits) und trnnstorming them into simple 
depos1tar1es. , 
2/\l.vin a., Hansen, ,.Bankers and Subsidies,," The Review ot 
Economics ruxi Statistics, (February; 1958), Harvard University. 
": ! • 
3aeduced to 4 per cent 1n le.ta 1962 .. 
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picture Of outmod~ requirements based upon en orig1nnlly more-than-
sut.t1c1ent money sup~ we.a thus not exo.ctly n true one •. Federal Reserve 
authorities reduced discount rates to i .. 3/4 per cent in 1958, and ~upplied 
commarciaJ. banks 'W1th $2 b1ll1on Of reoerves through System open market 
; purcbases, in addition to the funds released by the J.oilering reserve .. 
requirements which cmounted to an additional $J..5 billion in 1957-1958. 
In 1958 the canmercial. banks experiencod.tbree things which led 
to very tight reserve positions in spite ot rapid easina uction by the 
monetary authority. De!l1and deposits ot bv.nka increased by $5 billion, 
time deposits by $8 billion, a1X1 the out:t'low ot gold we.a greater than it 
. ever bad been--over $2 billion •. ·In consequence be.nkS found .themselves 
once again in a net borrowed reserve position at the end.ct 1958 having 
.. borrowed heavily during the year. 
In early l.9591 three changes 1n Section 19 ot the Federal 
Reserve Act irere 1nc.l.uied in a bill before Congress which was favored 
by the Federal Reserve l3oord. The changes would: . 
(l) :Permit member banlts to incl.udo all or part ot their vault cash 
holdings 1n their required reserves; 
(2) Set the range of reserve requirements tor central. reserve city 
bank& (in Bev York and Chicago) at 10-20 pe~ cent 1Jlatead or 
the preVioue range ot 13·26 per cent; 
(3) :Permit individual. banks 1n a central reserve city or reserve 
c1ty to carry the lcr.rer level of legal reserves established 
tor reserve city or country banks, respectively, it the 
"character'' ot their business made this appropriate. 
The Board noted that in 1917 vault ca.sh vas discontinued aa a 
part ot legal reserve of banks 1n an attempt to mobilize gold resenes 
in the Reserve :Be.nks. It said that nov ve.u1t oesb and gold. supply are 
unrelated, nov cash and reserves are both interchangeable end limit 
credit, and. the Reserve Banks would enjoy benefits ot larger.holdings 
of cash by members since less money would be transported and handled by 
the Federal Reserve; al.so, larger holdings of cash dispersed. around the 
country would facilitate excbonge 1n an emergency. l ot greatest ·· 
1mp0rtance1 counting ot vault cash as reserves it was claimed vould 
correct inequities e.ris1ng tram the need ot sane,.banks to hold larger 
amounts ot cash for operating purposes. The lo~er reserve requirement 
l.1m1ts (10-20 per cent) supi;:orted by the Boa.i-d ot Governors:tor central 
reserve city bankS (New York and Chicago) wouldequa.te their require-
. 
ments vith those tor reserve city banks. It ws felt that the upper 
. . . 
l1mit would provide plenty of room for any foreseeable increases 1n 
actual' required reserves.2 
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Public Law 86-ll.4, approved July 28, 19591 provided for these 
three amendments to the Federal Reserve Act, with the add.1t10nal pro-
vision that the classification °central reserve city bUnks" be' abolished 
1n 1962. This was very appropriate in light ·or the increasing s1m1..; 
larities 1n character ot business betveen Nevr York o.Iid Chicago banks on 
the one band, and large reserve city bonks on the other. Consrese also 
set the upper limits for both reserve city end central reserve, city banks 
lc.-Canby Balderston, Vice Chairman, Board ot Governors Of the 
.Federal Reserve System, Statement Before Senate Be.uldng and Currenc1 · 
Committee, March 231 1959· Experience bas not borne out all these 
advantages claimed by supporters of the vault cash amendment. 
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at 22 per cent vi.th a minimum ot 10 i>er cent (rather than thtt 10·20 per 
cent recommemed).l 
- - · - -- -Table 4 provides an interesting picture ot- tbe · tactors attectii:lg --
reserve positions ot member bank.a over the months during which these-
. - . -- - -- --- -- . ----
'. . ' ' . . ' ; 
reforms wre 1.mpl.emented. ! 
These reserve requirenent reforms ot 1959 were 1nt~rpreted by 
- , ,. , • '· • • I 
I 
the nation's bBllkS 8.8 a step toward tmir goals; but they were not enough, 
• , ' ~ Ir -' '"- '4 "- .. j • '., I 
principally because they left higher levels of nonearnine; as~-e-ts (legal 
reserve~) in the .brulde or' the central bank than. desired''b.Y t~ ABA. The 
. I 
ABA report ot 1957 had ended With the toll.owing e.dmoni tion: i ,. 
. . . I 
, . I 
· ••• the Co:amisaion wishes to stress· the necessity ot 
e.d.optiDS a comprehensive approach to the reserves problem, 
instead of deali.ng separately witb d:U'ferent aspects ot it. 
The need is tor a broad plan for overhauling the reserve 
structure. Specitically, it would. be a aerioua mistnke to 
enact legislation changing the status ot vault cash vitbout 
coupling this provision with other equal.ly desirable changes 
affecting the distribution of the reserve burden. (Italics 
supplied. ) , · . . ; 
, 
. ' 
It is, therefore, obvious that the J.959 changes ~ lav must ":·~ 
' ' . 
• ., • , , .. I 
have-in the eyes ot the ABA•-represented a "pe.tchvork reform." The ,_· . ' .. 
' ' ! 
1957 stud3' was, 1n a sense, s1ngularly oriented toward conditions which 
. , . '· . . ' • , . ' , " I " , ' 
. I 
would afford greater earnings tor the banke •. At the same time it wna . 
• "" ·t t .,._ I 
quite-comprehensive and-yet written in a -layman' e-J.anguage,i Two eubJects--
ot importance to the student ot reserve requi~nta· are ·treated 1n the 
ltBA study •. One 18 the question fJ£ fixed versus variable reserve ratios.2 
: 1 '1Implementation of the 1959 Act ~Reserve Requirements," 
Federa.i Reserve Bulletin, December 1 .1$6o. _ . . . , 
... ' . "'- ,t ! 
·' - '2For ex~e, th~ fixed ratio Of four per cent now prevailing 
ago.inst t1medepos1ts end the variable range against net demand deposits 
vi thin which the Federal Reserve Board is .. · authorized by J.aw. to mke · · 
changes. ·'·"- ' · 
TABLE 4 
FACTCllS AFFECTIOO Im>ERVE FOOITION OF MEMBER BANKS, 
NOV:EliBER 251 1959 ... DECFl413ER 14, l96ol 
(Signs indicate ettecton net tree reserves) 
Factor and t)'lle of bank 
l3ill1ons ot 
dollars 
Federal. Reserve actions related. to vault cash and 
reserve requirements: 
Country banks a 
Permission to count vault cash • • • • • • • • • • 
Increase in reserve requirement percentage 
(fran 11 to 12 per cent) • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Reserve city bSnka: 
Permission to count vault cash • • • • • • • • • • 
Central reserve city be.nks: 
Permission to count vault cneh • • • • • • • • • • 
Decrease 1n reserve requirement percentage 
(tram J.8 to 16-l/2 per cent) •••••••.•••. 
Banks 1n central reserve and reserve cities given 
permission to carry reduced reservess 
Amount or reduction in requirements • • • • • • • • 
Total reserve :t'unds released by above o.ct1ons 
System oiien market purchases ot Government secUrities (nut) 
Total. reserves supplied by Federel Reserve actions 
Reduction in gold stock • • • • • • • • • • • . • • • • • • 
Increase 1n currency in circulation • • • • • • • • • • • 
Changes in other accounts-•net ettect on reserves3 •••• 
Change in net tree reserves (excess reserves less 
borro-dngs) • • • • • • · • • • ·• • • • • • ·• · • • 
Excess reserves (increase) • • • • • • • • • 
Borrowings (decrease) •••••••••••• 
• • • • 
• • • • • 
• • • • 
+o.2 
+o.4 
-
" - • J. 
+1.1 
+o.6 
(2) 
+2.5 
+3.2 
-1.6 
-o.6 
(2) 
. +1.0 
0.3 
o.8 
lchanges based on averages ot doily figures tor two-week periods 
ending on these dates. 
2Less then $50 m:lllion. 
· . 3aopresenta changes 1n: Federal Reserve float, Treasury currency 
outstanding, Treasury caab holdings, dep0sita (other than member bank · 
.reservee) with Federal. Reserve Banks, and other Federal Reserve Accounts; 
also includes $100 m1ll1on increase in required reserves resulting from 
change 1n deposits (as it deposits in December, 196o had been aubject to 
l.959 reserve requirements). . _ : . , 
·Sources '1Implementation ot tbe 1959 Act on Reserve Requirements," Federal 
Reserve l3ul.letin1 (December, 1960), P• 1330. 
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The other concerns reserve treatment of interbank depoaitae.nd reserve 
credit tor .''Due From l3enke. 111 The ABA doea not· propose any changes 1D 
these im:portent areas of mechanical reserve procedures, and thia pa.per 
'Will accordingly not examine this portion ot the reserve question. 
Evaluation ot the Uniformity Prop0sa12 
The elim1nat1on of clasa1.t1ce.tiona ot banks tor reserve pur-
poses 1s recom:nended by all th& groups associated with the proposals 
revieW'od 1D this pa.per •. Some reasons for this proposal are readily . 
apparent. 
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Reserve sett.lament periods for reserve oity bank& are weekly; 
tor country banks the periods are biweekly. The origin ot this arrange-
men-t seems rooted 1n a compromise of various practices whiab prevailed 
among the.Raserv-e bllDks before i919.3 Th3 practice vas probably not 
original.l.y based u:pc:m ony monetary consideration since day•to•day · 
"defellBive" open market actions were foreign to the System at the. 
time. All 1-t; stands, reserve city banks' required reserves are based . 
upon a da~ average figured.over a seven day period which ems each 
Wed.nesday. Country banks' requirements are calculated over a two-veek 
period ending every other Wednesday. The required percentages are 
lirhe· Uniform Reserves Ple.n of 1948 proposed that 1n n corre-
spondent banking relationship, a reserve credit to a creditor bank equal 
to the reserve which the debtor bank bas to maintain against its inter-
bank deposit. 
2The structural effects of the unifon11 ty of reserve require• 
ments are prine1pally exemined 1n Chapter VI. · 
3when the System -was established in 1914, ee.ch Reserv-e bank 
wa.s free to prescribe its own settlement per10da. 
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calculated against tbe dll1l.y- deposits averages aver the jlei-iod., Unif'orm 
' '. \ . ~ . ~ 
requirements would thus el1m1nate the inequitable and. tbe\eome--.,hat more 
administratively difficult system attordedby different settlement 
' periods. 
'Tbe ClaSBit:f.ce.tion Of member COJ1111ercie1 banks into reserve 
city and country bank groups nl80 18 today the result Of a Cori:tpromiSe 
between historical precedent on the one band and on' the other, 8 desire 
on the part ot the monetary author1ties,to take account of' dep0sit turn.:. 
over am. the kind ot credit needs served by individual banks. , The 1957 
.A1lA study provides a searching nna.lysis of the· historical basis tor , 
,. d1tterent1al classification and contains 'persuasive evidence'. to' ahov .. ' 
that the geographical origins still substantially used as n baais for 
ClaSSif'.ying banks El.re entirely Without merit• , The study 1nsilt8 ::that 
·even U one can accept the questionable argument that extra liqUidity 
reserve backing :t.s needed tor oonkS acting es'dapositnriea=of other 
banka,.the geographical basis does not achieve·tm'deaired results. 
It is admitted that reserve city ban.kB s.a a grc)up hold.a much larger 
'prQ}X>rtion·ot their deposits in the f'orm of interbank balances;<but 
this proportion bas become smaller, om. banks in several cities not 
alassif'ied as reserve cities hold larger proportions o'f interbank 
balances than those: in some reserve cities of comparable eize. 
The clasai1'ica.t10n system 'Which prevaila today 1a more 
flexible than the one which existed in 19571 but the basic objections 
remain and the criteria are quite complicated. Generally speaking, 
·alnas1ficat1on procedures today place in the reserve city category: 
'" ; ·' < ' • ' 
(l).Banks locatins any ot ,their ottices in a city 1n vbich a Reserve 
,banli.or branch is located, (2) Banke locating 8i11' of their otftces.in 
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a city in which member banks at the citybold e.s much o.s 2/5 ot one, 
per cent of tbe total or all balances due to banks, (3) Be.nkS locatiDB 
any ot their of'ticee in a city in vhich local member bank& hold 2/5 or. 
one per cent of total demand deposits of all United States member banks, 
(4) Banks locating offices in a city in which one member bank bolds 
l/4 of one per cent of all the demand deposits ot United States member 
banks. Activity or turnover of' deposits is not considered when origi-
nally classifying banks in reserve cities., On the other hand, 1Dd1vidual 
banks iii reserve cities may apply to carry the reduced level of reserve 
specified :f'or country bankSJ in considering their request1 the Federal 
Reserve Board does consider the turnover of deposits toi:- trie.ind1v1dual 
bank ma.king spplication.1 Other factors considered include proximity 
-
ot the applicant bank to the financial area ot the city, number·or 
banking offices, size ot the larger individual depositor acco\mts1 
whether the bank purchases and sells in the short term money market, 
amount of deposits consisting of other banks' deposits, and--in generc.i.l.--
the character of:bus1ness of the bank.. Seemingly, the above procedure,,_-- .. 
is an· attempt more to classify banks on the basis of preserving relation-
ships betveen banks tha.n to take monetary considerations into account. , · 
It might be argued that individual banks vbich can claim to be .11 small'' 
by comparison are encouraged to compete unfairly with their larger 
city fellows. For these reasons it is felt that sizable adm1nistrat1ve 
. ' 
laegul.e.tion D of the Board of Governors provides for banks 1n: 
reserve cities to carry the legal reserves prescribed :tor country- ·banks 
(12 per cent age.inst net demand deposits 1n lieu ot 16-l/2 per cent) U 
the Boe.rd deems it ''reasonable and appropriate" in view or the character 
ot business transacted •• • • In the Fifth District (Richmond.}, only 
two bnnk6 applied for such relief in l963J these were newly chartered 
national. banks. 
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d.1.fficulties exist in having to reclassify banks under this complicated. 
form.ult:. and inequities a.re inescnpo.b1e. 01' all the mechonicel aspects 
pertaining to legal reserve mo.intene.nce, the latter criticism seems the 
·most Justi:fied.l It may be the.t the Federal Reserve Board wishes to 
retain the cle.ssifications in order that it may deal with concentrations 
ot excess reserves in the larger cities more selectively. 
Consideration of central bank services creeps into almost any 
discussion of legal reserve treatment ot the various classes of com-
mercial. bunks 1n the United States. Some services are rendered. country 
bunks vhich reserve city banks do not enjoy, e.g., free safekeeping or 
securities, prepaid delivery of currency and coin. On tm other hand, 
banks in cities where Reserve Banks or branches are situated receive 
earlier credit in their accounts for checks sent for collection because 
country banks 8.1ld other reserve city banks must suffer mail delays. 
' These end other detail.s would requirw consideration in conjunction with 
adoption of uniform reserve requirements. 
In summary, there seems little to camnend a system ot favoring--
through reserve requirement d.1.1"terentials--the "country" bankS of the 
nation. There seems little more reason to preserve "existing relo.tion-
ships 11 between banks than there is to 1mpooe u progressive tax on the 
gross sales of e. grocery chain--merely to preserve the country store. 
l A statement ot the Federal. Reserve Board 1n opposition to 
the proposal (considered by the 86th Congress in 1959) that the central 
reserve city classification be abolished reveals the Board's reasoning 
· in wishing to retain the dif:f'erentiols among banks for purposes Of 
monetary policy. 
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The Substantial Reduction Prop0eal .. ,. l · .. • I.~ 
The ~.•s desire tor substanti~ll,y lower reserve requirements 
must now be considered in terms ot several criteria. A tendency on the 
po.rt ot sane bunkers .to argue for 1over.reserve requirement~ .in terms 
ot nnrrov interests is revealed by the following letter written by the. 
president of o national. bank in North Carolina to the Canmi ttee .· on . 
Ban.kins and Currency of the United Stntes Senate on March 25, 1959: 
Speo.king as a banker with 48 years in banking and now 
president Of e national. bank ana member of the Federal 
.. Reserve System that ~sicJ we are :penalized tor being o. . 
member ••• • We • · •• are required to set up our reserve 
in the Federal. Reserve Bank with no remuneration except an 
· occaaional shipment of currency express charges free• · And,; 
in nddition to that reserve, we are required to keep money 
.. · · in our correspondent banks e.nd clear through those Jneriber · · · · 
banks who charge the life out of us tor clearing nonmember 
· bank checks. • · • • this excess kept in· the Federal. Reserve · ·. ·' 
bank as a reserve requirement is that much lost to us in 
· income vhich amount should be invested in goVernment bonds 
or loaned to our customers.l 
HopefUl..1.y, not all bankers ore so lacking in ~e:i;-standjng ot 
the purpose ot the.reserve requirement. Still, in spite ot its compre-
hensive and conservative natw.·e, the JJ3A study bas something of the 
' ' ' ' . t' 
North Ca.rolinn banker's preoccupation 'With bank ee.rnings~ 
First, vbat is the ef'tect on the money supply Of a given change 
- ·~ -- '~ ·, "' ~ .,,. - ,_ ' ' l .. i ' \ -
in requirements? Seco~, is such a change in the intel'(;!st of .. sound 
' i 
econOlllic growth tor the United States? Third,, hov "Jill ~e proposed 
level of reserves at.feet the safety of the banking system, ru:xl what 
effect will it have upon public service, upon growth ot bnnk1ng, upon 
'' . . " . . 
1Member .Bank Reserve Requirements, Hearings .Bef'ore the Com~ .• 
mittee on BnI>k1ng and Currency, United States Seno.t~, 86tb Congress,·.·. 
lst Session, on s.86o end s.1120, March 23 e.nd 24, 1959 (Washington: 
1959), P• 94. . , 
competitive reJ.o.tionships1 Just what is the optimum level.of reserve 
requirements over the long run? 
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The .Al3A concluies that reserve requirements can b$ reduced .to 
10 per cent of net demand deposits. It contend.a that present require-
ments are a. result ot till historical e.ccident••the gold intlov ot the · 
thirties•-Wld that these ere much higher than needed. tor monetor.r control. 
A1so, central. bank holdings of govermnent securities are sutticiently 
large to cope 'With any redundant bank reserves by sa.J.ea from its account. 
Indeed the System•s·holdinga, it ia sa1ct, are too large, am thus they 
could be used to ottset any undesirable et1"ecta on bank reserves ot 
lowering present requirements to the 10 per cent level. •. 'fhie would 
provide the commercial banks with needed liquid aeeet&J and, of greuter 
importance, to the ABA, additional reserves would be needed over the 
com1ng years.to provide tor natural. growth ot bank credit and money. 
The only alternative would be tor the "Fed" to.add to its al.ready 
"excessive·~ portfolio of government aecurities.1 ·11nelly, the ABA 
argued, the nation's canmeraial banks' relatively small ra.t1oa .ot net 
prot1te to capitol. accounts ond declining ratios ot cnpital. accounts to 
risk assets should be considered in setting appropriate leve1s of reserve 
requirements• 'l'bese legal reserves constitute nonearn1.ng e.sesets ot com-
mercial. bankS and. "excessive'\ reserves dwnnge banks' ' growth abilities. 
. What is the precise level ot reserve requirements needed in the 
United States? · Obviousl.y this is not. easy to determine. The treatment 
ettorded this question by the ABA. apparently consists ot (l) e.n argunent 
Lrbe Board of Governors' Annual Report far 1962 sb:>ws roughly 
$30 billion in SQ.1A. This may be contrasted w1 th $17. billion in total 
balances of member bankS held by the Reserve banks.· ·· · · · 
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that present levels are too high, (2) e proposal that requirements be 
reduced to lO. per cent, and (3) statements ot the benetits which vould. 
' 
ensue. The ABA study tails to examine nn,y foreign banking structures 
to find material tor its thesis. The present paper also lacks such 
material. The PJ3A work also lacks on analysis of the results of various c· 1 . . .. . .. - . . . . . 
higher or 10\oler reserve requirement. in terms ot acbievtns the beneficial 
.' . .. I .. 
results claimed. In other words, t~e selection and propos~l of the . ___ _ 
i 
10.per cent level seems almost arbitrary. True, the J\l1A recamnends a 
: ·. ·.. . . I . 
continuation of variable rutios witllin nn 8-12 per cent r-.:i.nge, but hov 
' 
vas this arrived e.t'l Wb,y not 6-10 per cent, or 10-14 per cent? . -· 
' . '•' . ' ' •,'•' 
· This writer has tailed to find 13JlY empirical date. relating 
~ ' .. 
' \ 
reserve balances maintained with the central bank. to the clenrin'~ · 
• • ' < ; • ' 
be.lances which member banks necessnrily mainto'.in_ .·to uss\ire continuity 
in paying tor checks, money shipments, bond.81 and transfers. It hardly 
! J .. i ' / 
' ' - , 
seems posaible for u member. bank to maintain less· bal.ance with a Reserve 
bank than is necessary to meet its debits. · Wll~t is this relation'ship'l 
' 
' . ' • I ' 
Fer the months ot October, November, and December, 1963; totnl debits to 
reserve accounts,ot the 271 banks in the Fed.6ri.:li Reserve Bank ot Ricbmond 
,. • j l 
', ~ r • I '/ ' 
(Head Ottice) territory Vere added each busine~B day. The aggregate 
I ; i 
reserve baJ.nnces each_ day were o.lso ·added for comparabl4r months •. , :for 
the three months, the ratios or totnl debits to total reserve balances 
were 72.0 per cent, 73.2 per cent, and 72.9 per cent. It the mid-point 
ot 72.6 per cent were to be applied to the ratio (14.8 P'r cent) of 
. . .. 
reserves with Federal Reserve banks (not including vault cash) to net 
demand deposits for banks over the compe.rable period, ve might say that 
a io.7 per cent reserve would have been needed tor temporarily adverse 
clearing purposes alone. Tt:.ble 5 provides an interesting compurison 
Date 
October l 
2 
3 
4 
7 
8 
9 
10 
ll 
14 
15 
~--- -·-- 16 
17 
-- --18 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
28 
29 
30 
3l 
MEMl3ER BANK RESERVE J\CCOUNTS .. DEBITS AND BALANCES 
BUSL~S DAYS OOTOBER l - DEC»mER 31, 1963 
(In Thousands) . . 
Federal Reserve Banlt or Ricbmond. 
Head Office 
Percentage 
Reserve of Debits 
Debits Bale nee to :Balances 
$ 298,090 $ 419,148 71.1 
283,628 434,785 65.2 
297,105 443,590 67.0 
277,202 444,148 62.4 
359,359 468,431 76.7 
290,105 436,742 66.4 
247,699 437,347 56.6 
286,094 424,145 67.5 
267,479 441,425 60.6 
381,663 424,446 89.9 
317,416 429,989 73.8 
286,747 451,994 63.4 
345,573 432,546 79.9 
291,451 437,367 66.6 
388,462 441,079 88.1 
302,319 4ll,6l.8 73.4 
284,528 395,803 71.9 
3o8,579 4ll,199 75.0 
28o,299 427,237 65.6 
402,219 4<>7,826 98.6 
300,244 413,ol.6 72.7 
305,946 417,490 73.3 
307,228 425,233 72.2 
Total. $7,109,435 $9,876,604 72.0 
Source: Files of Federal .Reserve .Bank ot Richmond, Bank Accounts 
Department. 
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·TAm.E 5--continued . : 
Percentuge 
Reserve ot Debits 
Date Debits Balance to Balances 
' 
-
November l $ 265,670 $ 437,318 60.7 
4 380,221 457,907 . ' 83.0 
6 495,592 389,477 127.2 
1 280,827 447,716 62.7 
8 287,868 446,386 64.5 
11 232,172 476,580 J.ia.7 
l2 327,596 434,784 75.3 
13 ·307,616 4o4,806 76.0 
14 307,158 430,384 71.4 
15 330,290 445,699 74.1 
J.8 435,547 451,96o 96.4 
19 ·' 331,826 ' ' . 398,149 83.3 '' 
20 266,020 420,312 63.3 
21 266,841 '433,780 61.5 
22 289,603 444,676 65.1 
26 5o6,611 410,396 123.4 
27 63,,007 4o7,968 15.4 
29 . 306,397 . 423,014 72.4 
Total $5,680,862 $7, 761, 312 . . 73.2 
December 2 $ 390,320 • 441,267 88.5 3 331,461 426,850 77.7 
4 297,199 429,618. 69.2 
5 299.136 429,414 69.7 
6 279,882 . ~ 439,363 63.7: ' 
9 331,229 480,934 68.9 
10 267,712 ' 451,179 . ' 59.3' 
11 268,998 421,312 63.8 
12 '.293,565 - . .· 424,784. 69.1 
13 264,o63 46o,o6o 57.4 
16 4o2,4o6 ' .. 472,350 ,_ ., ' 85.2 
17 314,678 443,166 71.0 
16 305,801 436,427 . '· 70.1 ' .. 
19 334,783 453,180 73.9 
20 316,899 '/, 446,951 ,• ,, 70.9· 
23 423,115 46o,693 91.8 
24 295,577 '· .. 458,002 ·64.5 
26 3171943 447,852 71.0 
27 310,239 436,670 71.0 
30 414, 783 442,921 93.6 
' 
,,-. 31 . - . 320,870 .. 398,577 80.5 
~-- . ·-~ "'' - -····-·-~ "'' .. . ... 
- $6, 78o, 659 ' $9~301,570 12.9 -· ~-·· '"'. -· Total· .. 
,. ". 
Source: Files ot Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, Bank Accounts 
Department. 
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ot book balances e.nd debits in the R1cbmond·ott1ce reserve accounts tor 
these months. 
· The abOYe 1a merely a brief' excursion.· l3etter ground. on which 
to evaluate the P.BA plea tor lover requirements 1• found. in 'the work 
ot Warren L. Smith at the uiiiversity ot Michisan~· Bia paper entitled 
"Reserve Requirements in the American Monetary System'' was prepared tor 
the Commission on Money and.Credit.1 The maJor comiid.erations involved 
1n choosing a level ot reserve requirement a are (l) the interest costs · 
ot the Treasur3' 1n managing the Federal debt, (2) the leTel ot bank 
earnings, (3) the leverage ot monetary controls, ·end (4) the structure 
ot ptibllo and private debt, according to Smith. 
Using various reserre requiremantlevels'ond making certain 
asaumptions--1ncll.ding e 3 per cent unnual. growth in m0ney supply, ·a 
30 per cent tax rate on holders ot government securttiea other.than the 
Federal. Reserve, a 90 per cent ''true rate" on· federal Reserve earnings 
paid to the Tz'easu:cy, a 3 per cent yield on governments, and a tend.ency 
OD the part of the public to hold 10 per cent ~ the money supply in the. 
torm ot coin e.nd currenay-·Smith calculates cbnnges in the Treasury• a " 
net interest costs f'rom the 1959 cost level. A 12 per cent ettect1ve · · 
reserve requirement vou.ld add abOut $9 million averaging CNer the ten : 
year period while a 30 per cent effective requirement vould·lessen 
Treasury interest costs by $443 mil11on a year or $4.4 billion over the 
ten year period • ..,;. Hence high legal reserves woUld. substantia.l.ly lower 
Treasury costs. 
lwarren L. Smith, Reserve Re uirements 1n The .American Monete.r 
System, Monetary Management a series of research studies prepared f'or the 
Commission on 1-!o~e.Y and Credit, Englewood. Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1963).. . 
2Ibid. 1 P• 221. 
-
·Banlt earnings ure greatly.affected by reserve requirement levels. 
'Assuming conditions of a tax rute on member bank earnings of. 43 per cent 
and a 1.6 pe;r:cent. return on earning assets (other assumption aame as in 
preceding parasrnpb), Smith aguin calculates tor different levels ot 
reserve requirements what change from 1959 levels would take pl.see in 
total protits c.tter taxes over the decade or the sixties. A l2 per cent 
level would yield e. $281 mUlion inareuse in 1966 (over l.959); a. 30 per 
cent level ot reserve requirements would yield only $96 million over the 
earlier le\•el,l Smith states that, whetller explicitly or by de£o.ult1 the 
central bank, through its ability to change reserve requirements, has tl 
policy 'With respect to earnings.of the banking system. In ratios ot net 
profits atter taxes to total. net asoets, commercial banks achieved a 
.10 per cent average return from 1953 to1958 compared to io.6 per cent 
tor all industries. In 1958 banks' return waa l.0.4 per cent--higber 
tban the 9.0 per cent return for all. induatries.2 Wbil.e these concl?Bions 
and statistics don't agree with those ot the l\BA (because the latter's 
represent an earlier periocl)1 this study reveal.& e. continuous an:l sizable 
reduction 1n ratios ot capital ... accounts to risk assets trom 25 per cent 
·in 1940 to l4 per cent in i959.3 Thie ve.e noted 1n the ABA study with 
an implication that release of nonaarning reserves would 1.Dcrease earnings 
and. thereby cause additions to oapitnl accounts. The principal. tla.11 in 
this reasoning ia that the increased earnings might be paid out in div1 .. 
dends and not added to capital accounts. On balance there seems some 
.1tb1d., P• 226. 
-
2 
.!2!!!•1 P• 229. 
3Ibid., P• 
-
231. 
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cause ~or aonaludirlg t.bu t balik, earn11lgs do, not need etrensthening by 
J.c>vering requirements •. Banks' earnings !!:! comparable to those ot other. 
industries, and they enJoy the benefit of I"ederel. deposit insurance in 
attractiDg d.eposi ts. · · If' secondary reserves are· too low, it· .would seem · 
to be a·cauae tor stricter supervision. 
Lower reserve l"\9qu1rementa provide tne central bank'with greater 
leverage in it• monetary e.ctions. The lover the required reserve per•: 
centage,:tbe greater tho effect ot a trenaaation in the open market by 
tbe .centrn.l bank• Expressed as an equation, this rele.tionabip may ·be· 
shown as: .K • l • Where K is tbe expansion multiplier, r is 
r (l ... c) + c 
t_he reserve ratio, and .c. is the proportion of the money supply held by the 
public in the form ot currency and coin. If' r is 10 per cent aDi c is O 
(tor sake or s1mpl.11'icat1on), then K is 10. Under such conditions a 
purchase ot securities by the central bank will release reserves end 
permit expansion ten times that 8l!X)Ullt. If' the monetary authorities 
misjudge the factors e.f'f'ecti.Dg resaNes (check tloat, gold, currency in 
circulation, etc.}, then--und.er conditions of low requirements--it will 
be harder to a.void overdoing the Job or :not doi.Dg enough. Little ce.n be 
proved 1n a pa.per of this kind concerning how mu.ch leverage is needed. 
Certainly the AfJA study otters nothing al.ong these lines. It is felt 
that with the sophisticated. system ot daily attention to factors affecting 
reserves which the Fed employs, there is much to be said tor lower reserve 
requirements and greater leverage. This is in support of a widespread 
belief that open market operations ere the principal and preferable general. 
credit contro1 tool. 
Finally, a. combination of circumstances aimed at achieving a 
greater proportionate output in the private sector ot our economy might 
not be unlikely 1n this deco.de.1 These circumstances wuld be "tight'' 
fiscal budgeting yielding signiticrurt. Federal. surpluses nnd an easy money 
policy represented by continued increases 1n central bank holdings of 
government securities. A ''drying up" of the government securities market 
might then obtain to a degree, making the central banks' control of bank 
reserves through open market operations more difficult. To the extent 
that reducing the level ol reserve requirements in lieu ot ndding to the 
Federal Reserve portfolio would otter more leverage while slowing down 
contraction ot privately held public debt, monetary management would be 
benetitted. 
1x'bid. 1 P• 248 • 
-
CHAP!ER III 
. ' l - ~~ 
THE CQOOSSION ON MONEY AND CREDrr RECQl.1MENDATIONS 
The Recommendations . 1 : , 
\'' Iv F 
In 1961 the Commission on Money and Credit published a report 
on its studies of the United Stutes monetary and tinancinl system. The 
fu.nds for the work were provided by the Ford Foundation, the Merrill. 
Foundation, and the parent orgnnization, the Committee for Economic 
Development. Five of the Commission's recommendations deolt directly 
. . . l 
with ~Dnk reserve requirements. 
,. 
The Commission estnblished topicel task forces to undertake 
i 
•1 
resenrcb projects which would provide information relating to each 
,· 
policy consideration. Each vae to provide arguments for and against 
tbe positions taken as well as alternative positions. Warren L. Smith 
vas asked to prepare the paper on reserve requirements. He was 
instructed to nppraise past proposals, study present requirements 
applicable to commercial. banks, study possible moditicotions, and 
analyze the e:t'fects--including questions of equity--on the primary 
classes of financial institutions. He was also to appraiSe reserve 
,.., . " .. 
requirements as an instrument or credit control. His paper ''Reserve 
, ·. 
Requirements in. the .American Monetary System" is perhaps the most. 
comprehensive work available in recent years on this subject. 
1Th~ Commission on Mc>ney and Credit, Mone£ axid. Credit ~,Their 
Influence on Jobs, Prices, and Growth (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice 
Hall, Inc., 1961), ~P· 64-66. 
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The recommendations .relating to·resel"Ve requiremen~ are broadly 
conceived in thie paper to include those releting·to membership roquire• 
menta and extensionot Federal Reserve controls over nonbenk,tinancial 
1nstitutions.l For sake ot convenience, the seven proposals considered 
will be grouped into tour .categorie~: · (l) recommendations tor status 
quo or those discussed else·.,here in this pa-per, (2) the spurins use ot 
reserve requirement.changes es~ contracyclical ~ool., (3) "universfll" 
membership, and (4) time deposit requiremnt .repcai.2 ' . 
The Commission on M:>ney and Credit recommended the t'ollovil':lg: 
. . 
(l) The present general. torm of fractional reserve requirements 
ogainst net demand deposits ia adequate tor the purposes ot 
. . 
general monetar,Y" policy 8lld the Commission recommends that it 
be continued. 
(2) The Commission recomnends that the demrun deposit reserve 
requirements tor all member be.nks be made identical., and 
that the classiticntion ot banks into countr,Y" banks and.' 
reserve city banks be el1m1nated. 
(3) The Commission recommends that Congress continue to grant to 
the Federal. Reserve Board a range vi.thin vhiah reserve require-
ments can be sot tor demand dePosits, ·perbSpa f'rom 8 to 18 per 
... 
. \ 
cent, so that the Board can adjust the specUic level to meet 
' 
the needs of' gro·ilth or to ·meet emergency needs. 
1ActUEllly "universal" x"nembershipts ta~~·t~ 1nclud~ all. 
insured commercial banks. There are a teil noninsured commercial banks 
in the United States and some mutual snvinga bank.8. Their total resources 
are not thought. to be en important part of the total for all banks. 
~e COmmisaion on Money and Credit, op. cit., PP• 76.78. 
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The first propose.l isn't evaluated because it doesn't recommend. 
change. The second two have been discussed 1n Chapter I under co?Te• 
spond~ng recommendations of the American Bankers .Association. 
Sparipg Use of Reserve Requirement Chnnges 
as a Contrac1cl1cal. Tool 
''The Commission believes tbut the pover to change reseI"V'e 
requirements should be used only sparingly, and favors maJor reliance 
on the use of open mnrket Operations for contrucyclicnl adJustments." 
The awkward nature or chrulges in requirements, used ns a 
countercyclical tool, is often said to be evident from the large change 
in banks' reserve positions tollowing even a one-bulf' per cent change 
1n requirements on demand deposits of all member banks.l Decreases 1n 
requirements can be offset by sales of securities 1n the System Open 
Market account which readily absorb e;tceso rese?'V'es created by reserve 
requirement reductions. Increases 1n reserve requirements directly 
affect all banks too; however, purchases of securities will not naces-
se.rily provide all banks with an opportunity to recoup reserve losses 
throue;h sale of assets or the type purchased by the FederaJ. Reserve. 
Then too, the concentrated impact of' changes in requirements on corre-
spond.ent city banks can result from adjusting their own positions as 
well e.e supplying (or using) th:!ir country correspondents' reserves. 
An e.."'ample io :provided in a study of the accounts ot o. number of smaller 
Richmond. Reserve District bankS following 1953 and 1954 reductions 1n 
lirhl.s wuld result in $500 mllllon change in reserves or 
ba.nks-·based upon net dema.ncl deposits aggregat1DS $107 b1llion for ell 
member benks in the United States on September ll, J.963. Source: 
Assets end Liabilities of All Banks in the United States, (Wasbingtont 
Board ot Governors of the Federal Reserve Syetem, September 24, 1963.) 
reserve requirements. These baJlkS were f'ound to have . increased their . 
correspondent balances,. that 1a, e.mounta · due :trm other banks by at lea.st 
half' the reserves released to them..l 
The direct action on smaller banks ot System action in raising 
and lowr1%lg requirements countercyclioe.lly 'W'Ould be inappropriate 'for 
tvo reasons.· First, such action might ultimately cause bank8 to with• 
drav tram the System. Secondl,y, f'requent changes might cause these 
banks to maintain greater excess reserves more or less pm:manentl.y 
in order to forego adjustments in times of reserve restriction, thus 
neutralizing monetary policy to aotae extent., While reaern requ1rementa 
.=!!!be reduced to obtain en immetliate et:tect tor all banka1 it m1ght1 
theretore1 be ditticult even with sld.llful. open market operat1ons to 
periodically tighten up reserves without discriminating age.inat some .r. ··. 
ccmmercial banks. 
Certe.1.nly open market operations vould seem to take· effect 1n 
areas vhere credit creating powers are most resll(m.Sive. Alao, this tool 
is less personal 1n nature. A sale to security dealers as a substitute 
tor en inorease in legal. reserve requirements 1s not nearly so apparent 
to a reserve city bank which find.a itselt approaching a reserve deficiency. 
The record tor the past decade readily testifies to the ettectiveness 
~the apen market operation; no 1Jlcreases in reserve requirementa. have 
been necessary. 'l'h1a proposal ot the CMC appears to be soUDd.17 baaed; 
it would continue the precision work alld hold on to the 11emergency" tools 
reserve requirement changes. 1'he latter vould come into the picture only 
'. 
l 117ifth Dietrict Member Bank Responses to Reductions in Reserve 
Requirements," Federal. Reserve Bank of Richmond MontlY;r Review, December, 
l.9551 P• 5• . 
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in times such aa prevailed during the gold intJ.ov ot the.thirties or in 
the event ot·e. serious recession in which a general 1ncreaae.:ln money 
supply could be reasonably ex:pected to generate eggrege.te demand.1, The 
CMC thus suggests a sort ot "standby control.'' .. 
. From an Mm:Snietre.tive stem.point, 111 1a e.rgued frequently, 
but unaonvinc1Dgl.;y'1 that reserve requirement changes caimot ·be made 111. · 
sms.ll.er increment• then one-be.lt percentage point. There is no reason, 
however, to think thnt 8ZJ:f decimai &)"Btem ot reserve requirement& woUld. 
not be entirely teaa1ble. 
It must be concl.uded that infrequent use ot reserve requirement 
cha.nges would serve to strengthen System membership e.n<1 quiet.the co.ll 
ror release ot "nonearning assets." On the other band, if' it :ta believed 
tllat monetary pol.icy is best contined to the volatile money market banks; 
em 1t reserve requirements continue to drif't downward as they have tor 
ten years, . we camiot ensily' Juetit,y tba noxt recomendation ot tbe cam .. 
m1ssion vbicb assures that universal membership 1n tbe Byatem ia both 
desirable and necessary for operation ot monetary policy. · 
., 
~versal Membership 
'''.rbe Commission recamnenda that all 1nsured commeJ."Cial banks 
ehould be required to become members at the Federal Reserve System." 
'l'he 6,097 Jnember banks 1n the System held $220 billion 1n 
total deposits on October -:JJ1 i963.2 1'otal deposits ot all United States 
1Monetary ~licy could be helpless 1n s~ ~i~umstances. An 
interesting discussion ot the "liquidity trap" described by Keynes is 
found. 1xi Gardner· Ackley's Macroeconomic Theoq:. (New Yorkt The 
MncMiJlen eo. 1 15)61), PP• 192·194. 
2Board. ot Gover.nor& ot.the Federal Reserve System, Federal 
Reserve Bulletin, November, 1963 (Washington), Principal Assets and 
L1abillties and Number, 'Pi:! Cl.ass ot Bank, P• 1548. 
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commercial. banks umounted to $265 billion.l. ·Because ot their relatively 
small deposits, the 7,443 nonmember banks holding $45 billion 1n deposits 
:are not indispensable to effective functioning ot monetary control. 
The Commiseion•s view is that the most impOrtant problem 
associated v1th nonmembership is the inequitable escnpe at these bonks 
from Wluence ot monetar-'J ];lOlicy.· Aleo, ''reserve requirements tor non-
member banks are established by sta tee end frequently are lover than 
requirements imposed on members, -which gives nonmembersbip a competitive 
advantage.'' The Federbl. Reserve bank Presid.ents, replying to a question-
naire tranSenator Puul Douglus stated in 1949 that "The wider the spread 
between member e.nd nonmember bank reserve requirements, the greater the 
deterrent to membership end the danger of withdrawal become. The p>ssi-
bility of vithdrewal from membership has to be taken into account by the 
Federal; Reserve in coll81dering increases in member bcnk. reserve require-
ments am this tends to inhibit the Syotem in me.king such increases." 
There ia some evidence that nonmember banks, which now bold 
17 per cent of total. deposits, are growing more rapidly than members or 
the Federe.l Reserve System. From December, 1945 to October, 1963, their 
share ot total deposit growth amounted to 22 per cent. From June, 1962 
to October, 19631 nearly30 per cent of totu1 bank. deposit growth was 
shared by nonmember commercial banks J nleo in this period a net ad.di tion 
ot 89 banks included 62 nomnembers.2 
The proposal is effective tram the stand.point ot securing 
membership,f certainly. , It also provides e. means at securing more 
2calculated from: filE:• 
equ1tuble treatment for coimnercial banks in the sense tht-1.t a kind of 
burden of restraint would fe.ll on all. banks equally. Since commercial 
be.nk.s bave tl1e special abil.ity to create money, they should, collective.1$ 
and equal.1.1, share the burden of restraining the unwise or inappropriate 
uee·of that ability. On the other hand, it is difficult to ascertain 
that et"tective exercise of monetary contro1 is not possible Yithout com-
pulsory membership or even uniform requirements. Evidence that desired 
changes in money supply can be brought about through open market oper-
ations reveals tbat only a minority of the nu:nber o:r commercial banks 
is necessary to achieve the results. Therefore, the residual argument 
tbat the reserve requirements on member banks constitutes a problem 
through threc~t of 'Withdrawal from membership is in itself a vulnerable 
position. Why is loss of membership a problem unless it undermines 
momte.ry policy? Why should monetary policy be restrained because of 
a threat ot membership loss? Unless it can be shown that the central. 
bank baa other tunct1ons which on.zy 1t cen perform (aside from monetary 
control) sat1atuc:tor1lt1 th@ desirability of "universal" membership is 
open to question. 
The Commission mentions the excba.nge charge l.evied by some 
nonmembers (against checks draw upon them) as a.n impediment to the 
United Btntea payments mechanism. This practice is al.owly disappearins, 
however, and there is little evidence that System membership is a factor. 
In addition, the central bank performs numerous :free services for member 
banke which alleviate somewhat their ''burden" of reserve differential. 
Finally, if un1£ormity of reserve in the desired end, then compulsory 
membership 1s not neceasary. Egual requirements for all Federally 
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insured banks would serve as well am be politicall.y more acceptab1e.1 
What do we want as n result of canpulsory membership? More effective 
monetary control'l A better payments mechanism? More equitable treatment 
for private enterprise at the hands ot Federa1 regulation? Tbere seems 
to be more evidence that the last objective is the one most likely to be 
achieved. 
Wbnt are the administrative effects or universal. or compulsory 
membership? It would certainly require more bookkeeping vork tor the 
Reserve banks. Also, the banks presently classed as nonmembers would 
be probably subjected to more supervision and rep:>rting requirements. 
Extension of present central bank services could be assumed. This would 
i-epresent an improvement and enlargement ot interbank service relation-
ships, e.g., supplying currency and coin, wire transfer facilities, 
sntekeeping and purchase and sal.e of goverilI!X:!nt securities, collection 
of cash 8l'.ld noncash items. These services central.ized would be performed 
more economically. Undoubtedly, the greatest burden on the centra1 bank 
would be 1n the e.rea ot supervision; this might be in the interest of 
stockholders and the public as it could result in more uniform and1 in 
some instances., more competent bank supervision. 2 Many relationships 
al.ready exist between the central. bank and nonmember banks 1n the area 
ot United States fiscal agency relations and through coll.ection of checks 
drawn on DOJlJilembers agreeing to remit at pir to Reserve Banks. 
From tbe standpoint ot structure, compulsory membership would 
undoubtedly affect ccmnercial bank correspou1iidlt relationst.ipe. Large 
lAll but three or four hundred banks are insured •. 
2Natione.l ba.nkS 1n practice are examined only_, by the Comptroller 
of the Currency. 
reserve city banks have come to.be, 1n the eyes or many' small country 
banks, the eque.1. of' (if not superior to) the central bank., The id.th-
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~val of' bale.ncea from city correspondents to establish legal. reserves 
with the "P'ed" am· the extension ot "Fed" services could well result in 
some decline. in clearing and other activities bet·o1een commerci~l C,ankS.l 
There is roan tor suspicion that the combination ot higher reserve.require-
mcnts for many SJDall banks alld. the ·ultimate breaking up of some . corre-
spondent relationships -would result in partial..iaolation a1ld. absorption 
ot many small unit baDits; There is also reason to expect the.t strict. 
sta:te laws age.inst branching would be hastened toward their demise.-.• .. 
Some·of the smaller unprofitable banks might become.more interested in 
selling out than in reme1n1ng as members with fUll ba.nk:Sng·responai• 
b1lit1ea. 
. ' .... ' .. , ~ 
... 
Repeal. or Time Deposit Reserve Requirements 
' . 
',. •',, .. 
''i'he Commission racommendS that exi&tillg statutory reserve · 
requirements against se.viilgs end time deposits be re:pealed• : . . 
: "The Commission . recomnends that· toore be no extension ot · 
direct Federa1Reservecontrols over nonbank financial. 1nSt1tut1ons." 
The secom proposal 1.B closely re.lated to the first one; tor 
the nonbanlt financial. institutions which are'caustng such concern to 
the banks ere natur~ their competitor& tor savings.' J'irst,. we must\ 
consider age.in the :funet1on of reserve requirements as they. appl:r to ... · · ., .. · 
~!me.deposits_ as well as def'ine aDi dit'terentiate betveen t1me de}X>sits 
lAlthough some member bariks now maintain both· a iegal balance 
with Federal. Reserie am a· clearing balance with one or more corre- : . 
s}X>ndents, tllis ia seldom.themost·protitableprocedure1for·utillzat1on 1 .o 
ot excess reserves. 
and demo.nd._deposits. or much importance to tho discussion of reserve 
against time deposits is the possible effect on monetary policy of 
shi.f·ts between the tw categories• The questions ot equity again arise 
and disparities are even more noticeable than those concerned \11th non-
member and member banks' demand deposit requirements. Member camnerc1e..l · 
banltS are subj eat to a tour per cent legal reserve. Nonmembers nre 
subject to requirements ranging from no reserve in tive states to the 
same requirements .vhicb are applicable to demand deposits in eleven 
states.l Mutual· savings banks in the major savings bonk. states aren't 
subject to asset reserves. Federal savings and. loan associations are 
subject to a seven per cent reserve requirement, but this may be kept , . 
in United States governments as well as cash. ·Federal. credit unions · 
are not required to maintain asset re~:r-res. 2 
There is a conspicuous absence of treatment in the'CMC work 
ot the liquidity tunct1on of reserves against time depQsits. 'Tbe,CMC 
supporting material. including Smith's study d1smisses the need tor such 
a liquidity reserve. The Commission's report, however, .recognizes a 
need but eta.tea thut management and supervisory authorities are compe-
tent to maintain liquidity. 
The other·ahoices open to the Commission -ror co::isideration 
were presumably (l) to require uniform reserves against both demand ; 
end time depOs1ts, (0) maintain present (lover) requirements but extend 
them to ull savings 1nat1tutions, alld (3) to eliminate re~erve requirements 
lSmitb, OP• cit., P• 3o4. 
2United States Bouse or Representatives, Subcommittee on 
Domestic Finance of the Committee on Ba.nkins and Currency, cow.rative 
Regulation& of Financial Institutions, 88th Cong., 19631 PP• f; ll3-ll5, 
13§:i40. 
ae;ainst individuals' savings dcpaai ts but to retain required reserves 
againat time deposits.1 
· BJ,1m1m1t1on of savings reserve requirements would not provide 
a detect in monetary control 1D the opinion ot ·the CMC. It did not 
believe therewreveey important shifts betveen demand andtimo.nccounta. 
Furthermore,·preaent time deposit requirements are .so low now as to make. 
it' rmJ1kel,y that complete el1m1nn.tian of. these requireIJWnts Would have .. n. 
material. ettect upon monstar,y control. 
Although it is true that the present four per cent reserve can 
hardly be necessary to monetary control, this does not seem to be ground 
for further opening up what e.J.ready seems to be a substant1a1 loophole. 
Camterciel. banko--1ml ;; ke pure savings institutions wbicb can only extend 
credit--create money as well. 'l'hey do so whether the deposit takes the 
form ot a time d.eposi~ or a demand be.l.ance. Time deposits ot member 
banks Of the Fed.erol Reserve System have risen more rapidly than any 
other group of institutions accepting these tunds. 2 Since 196o1 grovth 
1n member bank savings balances has ~~~~ gref\ter than 50 per cent. 
Tbe lack of statistical data. concerning debits to tiIOO accounts 
is a handicap to this study, but it seems safe to assume that savings are 
often ''spent'' tor goods and services. Thus they sometimes constitute a 
part of the m:>ney supply. Without any reserve requirements, a grovth in 
time deposits could tree reserves tor use in greater expansion ot credit 
1The latter only are open to corporations; at least this baa 
been the Federal Reserve Boo.rd'& ruling for many years·-nov challenged 
by the Comptroller of tbe·Currency. 
2Boa.rd. ot Governors of the FederaJ. Reserve System, Federal. 
Reserve Bulletin: November, 1963 (Washington), Savings Institutions, 
PP• 1548, 1560-1561. 
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and the money supply. While it may be true the.t time deposits do not 
tluctuate cyclically, the threat of "shitting'' would seem to be a source 
ot imperfection 1n monetary control. Furthermore, the size and growth 
of time deposits could accentuate this imperfection. 
The special ability of commercial banks to create demand money 
plus the tact that the1 have shared subetantie.lly in the growth of savings 
deposits (in spite of genernlly lower rates ot interest paid) also lems 
support to the second proposal which the CMC make& 1n_th1a area. 
' ' 
' ~ '. , 
CHAPrER I.I/ 
REPORT OF THE ADVISORY CCMilTTEE ON BANKnD TO THE 
COO'l'ROLLER .OF THE CURRENCY· . 
An advisory cOmmittee established by the Comptroller of the 
Currency presented u report entitled. National Banks and. the Future in 
September, 1962~ This' report,' often called the Saxon ReJx,rt, wns 
based, presumably, on f1nd.1.ngs from reports received from 11 500 national 
ba.nkS. · These banks· were naked to "reviev their· exp~rience ti.nd s~est 
- ' . ' ' • • . _I . 
any modification of policy or practice which they thought would promote 
. . 
the more ~f'tective ope~ution of' our National. Banking System.'' Question-
naires were used.· 
·Recommendations or the Committee ·w1hich were concerned vi.th 
bank r~~e;,es were:l 
··:c1) 
' (2) 
. 
Tha:t ull geographical differences in reserve requirements 
against cieilland deposits be eliminated. 
That legislative autlX>rity be sought to eliminate any" require-
,-' " 
· ment tor reserves against time uni s~vings accounts; aoo that, 
in the interim,· the required percen~ige should be reduced 
to ihe basic tbree per cent level set forth in the Federal 
· Reserv~'. Acf • 
._. lNational Banks and the Future, Report of the Advisory Com-
mittee on Banking .to the Comptroller of the Currency, United States 
Treasury Department, (Washington: Government Printing Ottice, 1962), 
p~ 126. ' .. ,, 
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(3) That reserve requirements against demand deposits be reduced 
to ten per cent, and that the Fed.eru..l Reserve Boa.rd be given 
the authority to vary these requirements only between eight 
·per cent and twelve per cerit. 
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These proposals ere almost identical. to same.made by the 
American Bankers .Association (Supra, Chapter I) tive years earlier. 
Further, the treatment afforded these questions (in the published report, 
at least) is rather superi'iciol.· Since we have alread;r discussed the 
.American Banker• Association proposals, no attempt vill be me.de to evalu-
ate the details ot the Srucon Report. It is interesting to note, however, 
tbe continuing attention in this report to the competition nf'tord.C!d by 
mutual: savings banks and savings and loan association• vbic.l:l s.re mt 
subJect to reserve requirements on time btilances.1 Also, the level of' 
requirements and geographical. differences involved in demand deposit 
reserves are attacked in the report. While mintaining that resel'Y'e 
requirements at present (high) levels are unnecessary tor liquidity und 
monetary control, the Saxon Report f'uils to provide on its face any 
reaaon tor reduction. Undoubtedly, the desire tor greuter e~rnings 
potential was foremost in the minds of tbe Comptroller's respondents. 
Some Justification may be found tor strengthening commercial bunks' 
capital structure (not dividends) and providing tor long term deposit 
growtbJ however, little evidence ia seen that either of these conditions 
vill be lacking under a dual banking system where 'banks are soundly 
organized in the public interest am competently managed. Witbd.raval 
trom Federal Reserve membership bus been rare even under vi.de dif'fer-
ences in reserve requirements between member und nonmember bunks. 
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A statement is provided in the "nnaJ.ysie or issues" to the 
effect that reserves aguinet time and auvings accounts ure not required 
tor monetary control purposes since the cred1 t-creating powers ot com-
mercial bankS do not nppl,y to their operations in the time and snvings 
tield.1 This statement seems questionable. Shifts or balances from 
demand accounts to time accounts ~-increase the supply ot lor•nable 
:funds because legul reserves on time accounts are lower. 
The call tor abolishment of time deposit reserves toils to 
account for the earlier contention ot the /J3A that banks with large 
saviDBB departments would have en "unfair advantage." Since the PJ3A 
has endorsed the Saxon Report, it too reflects an abandonment ot this 
conaideration of ethics on the purt of the camnercia.1 be.nki.ng community 
(supra, P• 17) • 
..: ., .. ' . 
1' t.: " 
CHAPJ!ER V 
REPORT OF THE c~ ON FlltANUIAL n~TITUI'IONS 
TO THE PRmIDENT . SP TJIE. UNITED STATES 
The persistenae.~ questions concerning tho appropriateness ot 
the wide rm:l8e of Federal. laws dealing with financial. institutions in 
the United States was evidenced by a memorandum tram President Kennedy 
to eleven Federal·agenciea on March 281 1962.l A committee, headed b,y 
the Chairman of' the Council ot Economic Advisors, was to ''review legis-
lation £lJld administrative practices relating to operations ot financial 
intermediaries. n Altbough the group was named the Committee on ·Financial 
Inat1tut1ons, it came to be. know intorma.lly ae the Heller COttlDittee, 
after 1 ts chairman• The Presid.ent directed that among the. topics to ,be 
considered wus ''tbe sco:pe Of controls OV"er. commercial be.nk8 encl other 
firumcial intermediaries exercised ey the Federal Reserve· System and 
other government am qua&i•goVernment .o.senciee 1 .. tor exe.mpl.e1 ·· membership 
1n the Federa.1 Reserve Syotem and. in the J'edarol. Hoim Loan Benlt System, 
reserve requirements, regulation ot interest ratea on deposits and other 
llabili ties aJld on government-guaranteed .mortgages• 112 .. · ::. , . · · · 
•; ~· •, .~ • (,, '. ~ { w~ ' •• '• • ' 
lThe agency heads were: Secretary ot the TreasuryJ Secretary 
ot"P.gr1cultureJ Director, Bureau ot the BudgetJ Chail'2nan, .. Federa1 Boille · · ·· · 
Loan Bank Board.J The Comptroller of the CurrencyJ Chairman, Council of 
Economic. Advisors; The Attorney General; Secretary of Health, FA:ucution 
ar:id Welfare; Chairman, Fed.era1 Reserve BoardJ Administrator, Housing and 
Home FillflnceAgency; e.nd..Chairman, Federal. Deposit Insuranc! Corporation • 
.. . ·' ' 2Unit~ States", Repo~ or 'the C~ttee on FiDLJ.ncial Insti-
tutions to the President of the United States.(We.shington: United States 
Government Printing· Office; l.963), P• 65. · · ···-------· ·: · 
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The Heller Committee findings presented Apr11·101 1963 inclUd.ed 
three recommendations regarding scape and· structure ot reserve require-
ments. Interestingly, nea.rJ..y a fourth ot the entire report's 6o }:'hgee 
are devoted to these first three conclusions. 
Voluntary Membership Coupled 
With Uniform Requirements 
Conclusion 1 -- The Committee, with one member dissenting, 
concludes tho.t all camnercial bunks ought to be subject to 
the reserve requirements specified by the FederaJ. Reserve, 
and. ought to have access to Fed.ero.l Reserve discounts and 
advances. Membership in the Federal Reserve System would 
continue to be voluntary tor sta.te-cho.rtered bnnks.l 
Some long run indication that the deposit growth rate among 
nonmember banks bas been greater than among member banks led the com• 
mittee to believe that a question of equity in the present structure is 
important. The earlier comparisons ot the member and nomember require-
ments certainly indicate the portion ot nonearning assets vhich the 
former must hold is greater. Hence, this must inhibit earnings as well 
as deposit creatiDg abilities to a greater degree. More important, in 
terms Of public objectives, higher member banl: requirements are s~id to 
be a deterrent to exercise of mnetary control. This possibility is not 
due so much to nonmember banks holding 17 per cent or con:merciaJ. bank 
deposits or even because they number 71 443 a.a opposed to 61 097 member 
banks.2 The chief deterrent lies in the poBBib111ty that member bank 
requirementf: might at some fUture time need to be raised to comparatively 
high J.evels end thus the threat c.S: J.ru.·ge sea.le withdrawals f'rom membership 
. libid. 1 PP• 9 .. 10. The dissenter member 1n each case is under-
stood to be"tile Comptroller ot the Currency. 
2Fed.era1 Reserve Bulletin: Novem~r~ i963, loc. cit., p. 11 548. 
might inhibit monetary policy. It really doesn't seem logical tor only 
some portion of' the small and medium sized ccmmercial. banltB to have bal-
· ances with the central bank vbile arguiog that these po.rticular banks' 
membership 1s essential for exercise ot public pol.icy. Wby then wouldn't 
it be necessary for ~ commercial banks to bnve balances subJeat to 
central. bank requirements? E1 ther the smaller banks are not needed WJd 
should be excused trom central bank requirements (even though Federally 
chartered) or all banks should be subjected. to comparable requirements. 
The Heller report presents the view that all bunks should be 
subject to Federal Reserve requ1rementsJ therefore, it sidesteps the 
politiceJ.l.y vulnerable propcsition that all banks be members of the 
System and preserves to a degree the dual.1ty at Federal-state banking. 
For this reason it is an effective proposal. The central bank would 
possess more precise credit tools and undoubtedly be less inhibited in 
. c:ircilmstances where competitive factors would have less weight. At the 
same time tbe proposal would be more palatable to proponents of state 
benk1ng. It must be remembered that commercia1 banks, by their abilities 
to create money, have widespread public responsibilities. Thereto~, it 
is apparent they should be wllling and able to assist public mnetary 
}X)l1cy when times dem<.:lld restraint. 
The idea that Federal supervision is aanehow related to monetary 
control remains in the writer's mind. While recommending uniformity of 
reserv"e requirements for all commercial banks, the Heller Committee 
. ndJn1 ts that un:U'ormi ty in supervision has varied trom time to tiioo 
depending on the views Bild temperaments at tbe responsible officials. 
In such circumstances isn't it conceivable that the Federal Reserve 
·Board might prescribe certain minimum balances, but lack the means to 
insure compliance? For this .res.son an ndministra.tive dete.at ,ep~ars. · 
The Reller report does not epecity that nonmember banks eub~ected to 
Fed.oral. Reserve requirements would have to curry these balancee with 
-
the Reserve bnnkS. Thie is the only conclusion.one cen drav; however, 
since the maintenance of legal reserves in correspolldents' . flccounts · 
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isn't presently p:rm:itted by tlle Reserve benks. Under the oircumstonces 
we cc.n assume that the new required reserves ·.rould have to be withdrawn 
f'ram correspondent accounts und deposited with Federal Reserve. Unless 
member bunks on the whole were to gain reserves by reason ot lower 
percentage requirements sufficient to off set ~osses ot correspondent 
baltinces, purchase ot securities in the System's Open Market account 
would be necessary to. provide the nece;,sery ''de.fensive" action. It is 
probable that Syntem liabilities vould. be SOlllewhat greater raising m.o~e 
questions about the domestic gold reserve required bylaw to back these 
liabilities. The independent bank.era would_probably urgue that pover 
to control bank cred1 t throushc>ut the comnercial banking ~ystem will 
incvi tably be followed by power to supervise. . Next central banker a will 
viah to eliminate nonpar check clearing and so on. Neither arguments 
against the Heller proposal which condemn loss of locul rights to 
supervise banking nor those arguments infuvor which have to do with 
the i~quities inherent in the present situution carry·as much weight 
.. ,. ' . 
as the case tor tull monetary control. Fr1nc1paJ.li, the emphasis on 
the etruct~ aspects ot this proposal.will be found in Chepter VI 
(intra, P• 75) • 
Fran Dll edm1n1strat1ve'stenipoint1 Federal Reserve bookkeeping 
capacities could be doubled without difficulty as most Reserve banks 
possess modern data processing facilities. A mechanism similar to that 
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provided tor member bank8 tor weekly reporting ot nonmember cash1 deposit, 
and reserve figure& to the Reserve banks wuld tmdoubtedl;y be necessary. 
This reporting requirement might be slightly onerous· to some miw.ll non-
membor banks. Increased check volume tor Reserve banks would occur to 
a· small degree. C1ear1ng operations ot the correspondent city banks tor 
their nonmember associates would go on nnd. Federal Reserve would ultimately 
handle these checks BJlYWD.Y• It is felt that a large i:ort1on or non-
members' balances would be preserved in city banks even after meeting 
Federal. Reserv~ requirements. There they vould continue to command the 
e.ttention and services ncr.r provided by the city correspon:lents. In short, 
there would be some but not a material. disruption in the correspondent 
banking relationships. 
Access to Federal Reserve discounts and advances is not exactly 
related to the limited confines or this paper. It, hovever, one can 
effectively argue on the grounds of public interest that all ccrnmcrcial 
banks ehoUld be subject to reserve requirements ot the centrai bank, . 
then it must follow that all banks should be afforded the.opportunity 
Of borroving from the "lender of lnst resort." 
grruiuated Reserve Requirements 
Conclusion 2 -- The Committee, with one member dissenting, 
concludes that a system of graduated reserve requirements 
. for demand deposits would eUm1nate mrul:f ot the inequities. 
and administrative dif'ficultiea in the present system ot 
: reservo requirements, and wouJ.d fccilitc.te n decision to 
brinS all commerciel banks under the reserve Jurisdiction 
ot the Federal Reserve. 
In an a.ttiosphere of comp1ete retorm, one co~ $uppose that 
the graduated system would preserve inequities.among the classes it 
. ' ' ~ . 
prov~de_~ for. On the other hand, the Committee has recognized the 
politice.l uncertainties or the ''impact'' ettect inherent .in a. system,, 
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of uniform requirements. The J.a.rs~r bankS have long been recognized ea 
having greuter velocity effect in the exchange equation.l The graduated 
reserve arrangement implies a recognition that size of deposits, ipso 
facto, is indicative of velocity. · Tbis is not necessarily the case, 
however. 
The Heller graduated reo~rve would be .feasible trom an 
administrative standpoint with some minor difficulties .:.1pparent. It 
would do away with tl1e difi'crcntial requir..:ments <J.ccord.ing to geography. 
CJ.a.ssifict, tion would no longer be neceasery. Some blinks would. not be 
in •. ~ position to know their required reserves until the period involved 
were over since deposit levelr:: would not be precisely lmown; therefore, 
the present be.sis of :::lculL>tion by Federul Reserve member bunks would 
not suffice. If some pu.st average or :figures as or ,, given dt~te were 
used, reverse "Window dreeoing'' might be the order of the duy. Perhaps 
the best system would be to t.llow the ;10t demand deposits of one period 
to determine the required reserve of the srune period on a daily b·"sis. 
The Heller ~xrunple was: (l) 1 pe! cent on the first $5 million in net 
demand deposits, (2) l2 per cunt on the next $95 million, and (3) 16-l/2 
per cent on ull net dem::~nda in excess or $100 m1l.lion. Thus, the hmker 
with a daily average o:.,.' $110 million in net demand deposits would--midway 
ot a reserve period--calculo.te his average required reserve at $5.4 
million. This would result tran: (l) $350 thousand, (2) $3.400 million, 
end (3) $1.650 million. To this $5.4 million requirement would be added 
or subtracted $16-l/2 thousand for ea.ch $100 thousand in deposits gained 
or lost per day for the remainder of the reserve period. Such a calcu-
lation would certainly be more complicated than the present system. 
1Money supply times income velocity equals national product 
times the price level, or Ml = Pl'. 
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The graduated system would be effective; it would probably. 
facilitate monetary po11cy·n& well as any other system includiDg the 
present one. · It might be argued that the reserve ottect ot System open 
market policy vould be more indeterminate by reason of not knowing the 
distribution of purchase and sale effects UJIOll the three categories Of 
banks. If' purchases f~ed,, for· example,: to provide reserves to the 
smnller banks in an instance ot supplying ·reseNes to ·the banking system, 
then the multiple expansion possibil1tiee might be lessened. , However, 
I . ,, ~ ' " .- ' ' ~ • • ' ~ < '" I 
this toctor of, uncertainty obte.ine .. under .. the :present classification 
according to city or country status. By graduating requirements accord-
ing to size of ba.nlt1 the impact of monetary policy vould·be leveled out 
~or all bonksbecause the larger e.Dd more vo~tiJ.e deposit accounts 
wuld be subject to more restraint. · .... 
·.Chapter VI reveals the· structural effects which might result. 
from the graduated reserve of the Heller. repcrt. fuided strength to. 
the smaller member bank would be nf ford.ed by a five-twelfths drop in 
requirements.· It is entirely posoible t_bat the· seven per cent required 
reserve at these bank&, lees provision tor.vault cnsb,· would.be insut~ 
ficient to ser1e as a a1earing balance.:. These banks might maintain 
excess reserves nth Federal. Reaer1e sufficient to meet check clearings, 
currency orders, TrellSury tax and 1oan culls, etc.j or these banks 
might look·to their correspondents to maintain their clearing accounts. 
The' result' could be a. loss ot clearing bo.J.ences from the .central banks 
·to the correspondent· city banks to offset. the opposite et.feet mentioned. 
earlier in this chapter. Most bank&· wuld receive a benefit of .reduced 
reserves under·tbe Heller-suggested levels. Some ot the.larger .banks 
vould losee.n indeterminate amount ot balances due .to.other banks. 
A ta--r ot the largest country banks vould experience a rise 1n require-
ments and perhaps a loss of balances as well. 
The chiet criticism to be leve1ed against graduated reserve 
requirements is that they discriminate against size. 
Extension of Uniform Time DePosit Reserve Requirements 
To Other SavAAs8 Institutions 
conclusion 3 •• The Committee, with one member dissenting, 
favors the continuation of reserve requirements on tim and 
savings deposits at oamnercial banks, and the introduction 
ot a simjlnr reserve requirement for shares at savings and 
loan associations and deposits at mutual. savings banks. 
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Since this paper 1• concerned with camnercial banks, it is 
tempting but difficult to discuss the re1at1an between reserve require-
menta on aartngs end loan a.asocia.tions and those on time and savings 
depoaita ot commercial banks. .Perhaps one might dodge this question by 
aasumiDg tba.t reserve requirements are not inteDded to assuro liquidity 
and that savings deposits are not part of the money supply. Therefore, 
a hasty conclusion might be reached that reserve requirements egainst 
saving8 deposits aren't relevant. Both premises are subject to serious 
question and so one must at least consider, as tor as camnercial banks 
are concerned, whether Conclusion 3 1s feasible, ettective, and 
atr.ucturally souoo.. Bane few comments concerning other 1nat1 tutiou 
are unavoidable. 
Unlike the proposal concerning deme.Dd deposit reserves vhich 
would provide tor central bank-prescribed minima tor all com:nercial 
bmllts, the time and savings requirement would extend to ell. important 
cl.asses ot savings depositeriee excepting credit unions. In this case, 
the'Ccrmmittee evidently assumes reserve balances of the savings am loan 
associations would be maintained. by their supervising agencies. The 
62 
cuatoey ot mutual saV1nga and loan aasociationa' reserY-e& 11 admittedly' 
complicated by current questions about Federal. chartering. · · · Th8 study· ·. 
overlooks nonmember commercial banks. These, it will be remembered, 
bs.ve to put aa1de varying reserves against their time deposits ranging 
trail 20 iier cent in J'lorid.a to o per cent 1n tour other litates. It 
aeema logical to assume that they WOUl.d be required to maintein'equsJ. 
time and savings reserves \iith the Reserve Bank.a. Thia wuld result in 
some 8dd.it1ona.l witlldrawul.s from correspondents. Since this typo of 
deposit is typically stable (in total) e:Dd.'c8.sh-'W1thdrawal.8~are more 
or less predictabl.e, tbe structural ettects upon 1nst1tuticma·not now 
subJeot'vould not be important, assuming a three or tour per cent 
requirelllent. If,-bowever, saVings in tuture time• take on the obarac• 
terist1c of bigber ve1ocity; then they might be subjected to much' 
higher reserve requirements.- In such circumstances / ·.saving• ·and· loa.n ·· 
institutions would eJJJoy a sizable advantage OY&r caamerc1al banks · , · · 
rlthoutthe Heller prescription. Sane nonbank t1DB11cial 1nlt1tut1ons 
are app!rentlJ' lean1Dg tO'-rard nonliquid positions ecoording to recent 
reports. 
There should be no adm1m.atre.t1ve dit'ticultios·1n·cori.tinU1ng 
the requirement tor ·member banks or in extending it to nonmember banltl 
or DOnbank inStitutions. Here again· it seems most businesBlike to baee 
required. reserves tor a given period upon the deposits m· tliat seme 
period• 
·· .. 'JUdgement ot the ettectiveness ot ster111z1ng ~rt· ot savings 
end t:tme deJ)081ta against credit expansion must be preceded'b:Y a·atatement 
Of logl.aal purpoae tor such sterilization. First, camnercial banks 
create 'tIJDfll!SY' whether the proceeds ot a. loan ultimately' come to rest in_ 
a demand .2£ a time account. Secondl;y, deposits can •hj_ft from d.emsnd to . 
time accounts and bock again. When they move toward. e. al.ass ot deposi ta 
:requiring more or. less sterilization, then tree .. reserves change. The 
amount ot change 1a equal. to the dit;f'erential. between tbe prrcentage 
required reserve.on the two deposit olaasiticationa. Theretore, sano 
reserve against time depe>site is needed to lessen the differential. ' 
ef'tect end to disoourage use or saviDgs deposits as o.··substitute tor 
high velocity money. 
· Secomary considerations aro: (l) liquidity, and (2) tbe nan• 
equitable arre.nsement prevailing now wherein competing institutions are 
variously subJeated to either no requirements or to legal.m1n1trl8. 
Uoder the National Bank Act ot l.863, .reserve requirements on 
time deposits were at the same level o.s on demand accounta. The Federal 
Reserve Act of l9l3 provided a differential based UpOn the :t'1nd1ngs that 
the ti.me.accounts were lees volatile and reqUired less protection against 
sudden ~thdravnl •. The approach of the Beller .. COimnittee waa· aimed at 
deciding the all 1mportent question: .Aro time deposits properly a· part· 
ot the money supply'/ i'be Radclifte Report (1959) in the United Kingdom 
was said to tee.l that central. bank contro.l 1a. needed over!,!! 1nat1· · 
tutions whose Unbilities are close substitutes far money.l ·Tm clear · 
inference ie that savings OJld loan ebarea1 for oxample, are close substi• 
tutes tor WJD.ey. The Reller report,·whlle asreeinSwith tbis general. 
conclusion of the Radel.Ute Report,. tind.s no empirical evidence that 
nonbank tinencial intermediariert have.weakened countercyolica.l monete..r;y 
policy~ Rather,. the committee's conclusion is seemingly baaed ego.in 
laeport ot tbe Committee on Financial Institutions, !2£.• .£!! .. , 
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upon the equity ot the situation. Thus, it may be open to the accusation 
that in its attempt to eqUalize competitions~ it: has overlooked tbe :tact 
that nonbank institutions are mt really competing since tbay serve the 
public 1n a, specialized fashion instead of performing a general service. 
Fran the point ot viev ot this paper, a better approach might 
be to determine whether ~ime end envinga accomts do or do not act o.s 
money. If they do then the central bank must have tull monetary control 
powers. If only liquid.icy ie involved then the liquidity needs peculiar 
to the kind ot institution responsible for such deposits might be more 
relevent thane. uniform.approach. The Heller Cc:mnittee speaks first 
ot inequities) then it ollncbea its argument vith a belief that central 
bank-prescribed controls over nonbank inatitut1ona would be a valuable 
supplement to m:>netary policy. Thus, it apparently aims tor e. new 
selective credit control which would not be justified. Furthermore, 
tbe huge grovth ot time deposits in canmarc1o.l banks of late hardly 
seems en indication that they are not attracting such deposits sut-
ticiently. 'l'he structural effect is, therefore, meant by Conclusion 3 
ot the Heller Camnittee to be the real targetJ that is, a realignment 
ot competitive relations. Fraciiice.l.l,y, it vould seem more logical to 
impose special liquidity requirements· on nonbonk financial. 1nstitut1ons 
for the protection of tbe general public; or upon determination that 
the money supply cannot be i\1lly controlled without these uniform 
requirements, to impress them on that basis alone. 
In omnmary, tho first three conclusions reached. by the Heller 
Committee, considered together and with the remainder of the report, 
constitute en etf'ective means ot streamlining monetar,y J?Olicy vitbout 
serious Jeopardy to private financia1 enterprise. Their adm1n.istration 
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seems entirely feasible. They uro admittedly pointed 1n the direction 
ot eventunl uniform requirements. They would, if' adopted., conform to a 
long treDd 1n the direction ot a benkjng system oriented toYard national 
obJectivas. 
' ~ ·, • j 
1)' 
' ' 
. ,. 
·• 
CHAP.rER VI 
BRn:F STATISTICAL AI'lALYSIS OF THE EFFECT OF UNIFORM 
AND OF GRADUATED RESERVE REQtJirul.lENI'S ON 
UinTED STATES BAln<B AlID ON VIRGINIA BANKS 
It is difticult, perhaps even impossible, to.determine.the 
effects of' these proposals empirically. Given static balances and 
relationships between banks 'end with the public, the etf'ect of a change . 
1D reserve requiremsnts can be predicted.. These conditions do not obtnin 
however. Distributions of assets and l1e.bU1t1eo among the nation's 
commercial banks .and other institutions would change in indeterminate 
ways with ohangee 1n legal requirements. ArJ3' change in tree rese?Ye ot 
Be.nkA might cause it to increase or to draw down its balance with 
Bank B. The.situation is complicated by.the te.(lt that the.central bank 
which holds the legal, reserve also 1s a· clearing. bank. · · · " ' 
It :ls :nonetheless intriguing to speculate upon the possibili-
ties open to a siven bank or group of banke were a particulal" change·· 
1D reserve requirements to take place •.. The two. proposal.a moat readily 1. 
adaptable to "face value" analysis are·the uniform requirements mentioned 
in tbe:report of' tbs Commission on Money and Credit end.tbe·graduated 
requirements ot the Heller report' · 
The CMC Ef:t"ect--United States 
'The unif'o~ ·req~nt· proi:osa.'l is not'origintil '\olith the CMC 
report.. .In tact, there is . aireadi. a i'unitorm" ·: re~erire tequiXemnt 'aga.inst 
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all member ba.nkS' time deposits. About the only way one can easily 
determine the effect of a uniform requirement on net demand deposits is 
to obtain· a ratio which, if' applied to the net demand deposits ot all 
banks, vould yield reserves equal to those which actually prevailed under 
the pericd. ot time studied. This approach at least serves to illustrate 
the effects on ve.rious classes of banks am to indicate e. formula far 
tuture use .. in determining the ettects of uniformity. 
In order to accomplish this analysis on a nation-wide basis, 
Federa1 Reserve Board semimonthly statements showing data for all United 
States banks were utilized..1 The ratio of net demarxl deposits of member 
be.Ilks to canbined cash enl reserve balances with Federal Reserve banks 
was determined for twelve dates (one each month) in 1963.2 This ratio 
vas then considered (in the absence or any legal. requirements against 
time deposits--·,1h1ah the CMC favors abollehins) to be the prevailing 
uniform legal reserve percentage. 
Table 61 which produces an average annual ratio of 18.3 per 
cent based \ll)OD member banks' cash end. reserve balances, illustrates the 
application of the monthly ratios to nonmember banks. Three flails in 
this applied reasoning should be pointed out. First, since nomnember 
bnnks do not ?00.1nte.1n reserves on the same basis e.s member banks do now, 
the monetary authorities might wll consider an entirely dif'terent ratio 
appropriate tor ~ bonks aa opposed to the one which prevails tor 
member bank& at the time tl:e uniform requirement is put into effect. 
lBoe.rd at Governors o£ t:te Federal Reserve System, ''Assets 
and Liabilities of All Bank.8 in the United States," Bo. J. 4. 
211Net demand deposits" was computed by deducting .f'ran "gross 
deman:l deposits," "cash items 1n process'' and ''due from banks." 
'. 
I 
l ) 
.. 
'' . .· . . . · · T1B~ 6 ' 
APPLICATION cg UNIFmMRESERVE REQfJIREMEN.l'S TO .NO~ COMMERCil!l J L7iC3 Til UHITED STATES BASED UPON RATIO CF RESERVES Cl ME2rl.Bm BANKS 
TO NET DEMAND DE.Posrrs, AND ELDUNATIOII OP REQUIRED K!;,S• n; :'G r,JJ.:.:T Til·iB DEf'OOITS, LAST WEDNmDAY EACH MONTH 1963 
· · (Figures in mHl ~1S ot' u.cllo.rs) . 
I 
I 
' lf 30/63 2/27/63 3/27/63 4/24/63 ·; ._. r· - 6/26/63 7/31/63 8/28/63 9/25/63 l0/30/63 ll/zr/63 12/25/63 ) •'" () --,,,,, _i 
l 
-
Member Banks l " I .. l. Reserve With '' Federal. Reserve &u1.lt8 'l.6,262 ' ' ' J.6,252 16,259 16,623 15, ~·21 16,511 16,768 i5,936 16,351 16,379 .. 16,068' ' ·~,776 
2. .Cash In Vault. 3,262 3,249 + 3,227 3,266 .. ~:·f' :i, [.·,,...; 3,422 3,397 3,440 3,458 3,550 3,448 3,661 
3. 'Total (l + 2) 19,524 19,501 19,486 19,909 l~,12) 19,933 20,165 19,376' 19,809 19,929 19,516 20,437 
4. 
. 
-
! 
' ... 
" 
Bal.unces With ' ' ' " 
: ; 
... 
·. Canmercial BankS . , . 6,946 7,225 7,027 7,0)4 6,c; :j '(,26o I 7,221 '; 7,090 ·7~445 7,'382 
. 7,758 ' 7,958 
' "'" 
' 
" 
). Cash Items In Procees 13,554 14,745 13,172 13,431 l:t, 9l;~ 14,579 15,002 13,161 14,957 J.4,584 17,002 l.6,26o' 
6. Total Dsductions (4 + 5) 20,500 21,970 I 20,199 20,525 21, E'LJ c.:1,839 22,223 
20,251 22,402 . 21,966 ' 124, 760' 24,2~ 
... I 
7. Grosa Demund Dei;osits 128,188 128,898 J.Zf 1lll 126,511 12{ I J_(J.) 131,493 130,716 .125,670 131,732 129,939 133,499 138,117 i 
8. lass Deduction (6) 20,500 21,970 I 20,199 20,525 21,Gl:-~· ~:l,839 22,223 20,251 22,402 21,966. 24,760 24,218 I 
9. Net Demand DeJ'OSitB 107,688 lo6,928 I io6,912 105,926 io:;, 223 l(i9,654 lo8,493 105,419 '109,330 107,973 lo8,739 113,899 ' I 
10. Ratio (3 : 9) 18.1 J.8.2 J.8.2 iB.8 18.2 18.2 18.6 18.4 18.1 18.5 17.9 17.9 
. ' 
Nonmember Banks lAll Commercial Banks 
Lesa All Members) 
l. Gross Demru:ld Deposits 23,052 23,022 22,659 23,159 ~~2, ')2~( 23,,577 . 23,484 23,J.80 23,948 2Z.,161 
24,631 25,193 
2. Balances With Commercial 4,415 4,538 ' 4,5~2 4,712 
Banks 4,244 4,335 4,223 4,656 4 5t.i•) 4,650. '4, 739 4.,630 , ·-
3. Cash Items In PrOaeas . + 386 + 375 348 369 3JtJJ 361 388. 329 363 - 396 
458 430 
4. Total Deductions (2 + 3) 4,630 4,710 4,571 5,025 4>8)0 5 Oll 5,127 4,959 4,778 4,934 5,000 5,142 
' ' 
5· Net ).)!mand Deposits (l - 4) J.8,422 18,312 lB,o88 l.8,134 18,0J'{ lf;,566 J.8,357 18,221 
19,170 19,227' 19,631' 20,051 
Gross Required Reserve (5 ~ 10) 
'. 3,514 . 3,589 
6. 3,334 3,333 3,292 3,409 3,283 ~3,379 3,414 3,353 3,470 3,557 
7. Less Cash In Ve.ult - 1,078 - 1,071 .. l,053 i,oo4 5*82 l,o48 1,073 i,050 
l,092 l,140 l,092 1,139 
a. Net ReqUired Reserve (6 - 7) 2,256 2,262 2,239 2,405 2,.301 :., 331 2,341 2,303 2,378 
2,417 2,422 2,450 
. ' 
; 
Source: · Boa.rd of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, l1ti . BankB in the United States," NO• J. 4., 1963. 
.. 
"Assets und Li1' 'b !$ Of : ll · . . . . . · 
., 
.. 
; 
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"· 
The precise legal ratio f1naJ.ly selected Yould have to be based.. princ1-
1 
pally upon desired eti'ecta to be obtained 1n the money supply. SecoDdJ.i, 
l 
the member bank ratio of l.8. 3 per cent includes about $400 million in 
excess reserves which is 2 per cent ot required reserves.l. Lasti.;r, the .. 
11upper l.1mit 11 Sllggested by the CMC was to be l.8 .per cent. Our selection 
or 18.3 ;per cent can be considered somewhat high. 
,-/ ' 
Table 7 illustrates the effect ot application of the 18.3 per' 
! 
' 
cent reserve requirement upon the various classes ot banks as they existed 
on December 25, 1963. Nonmember banks end their correspondents vou¥ b~ 
the ones Mat e.ttected by this proposal. As new members or·the Federal 
Reserve System they would have bad to dra.w down corresI>Ondent balances · 
I ' 
' 
eque.l to $2•5 billion, neauming they would not vieb to liquidate other 
assets, This woUld constitute more than hal:t :or all their balances due 
"' 
.£rom banks •. ulldoubtedly, maD.Y correspondent relationships would cease· 
.to be profitable an1 use of central bank services would grow. 
Although "country" member banks bold 43 per cent of their ,totnl 
gross deposits in the time category, end these would no longer be subject 
to !Br requirements, this group of banks might be hardest hit among .the . · 
~ 1 ' 
member bank groups. 'This is due to their no longer being able to enjoy .. t l 
a preferential reserve rate 1n re1ation to the ''reserve city" banks., 
Their required reserves would have been raised by $1. 2 billion and ·.rould ." 
. ' ; .. 
largely have to be secured from their bnl.ances due. from· bankS 'which l 
amounted to .$5.2 billion. The $2.5 billion which nonmember banks ·JC?uld 
draw out ot correspondents and trs.ns:f'er to Federal Reserve would 
lzt does not seem improper to aons1der this two ~r cent 
excess as "required'' reserve. All bunks, especially smnll country banks, 
are inclined to maintain some ma~gin ot saf'ety ·~over absolute legal · 
minima. t \ 
~ 
0 
l.. 
2. 
3~ 
4. 
5. 
6. 
1· 
8. 
-
9. 
10. 
·' 
TABLE 7 
Af'l?LICATIOB OF UliD'Cml .·BESERVE. ~tlIRl!MEm.1.S 'l'O .AIL ~CI.AL lWiKS IN UNITED BT.ATF.S 
BASED uroB l.8.3 Pm Clm RESERVE REQU'IRFlmllr AGAlN8T 
, ?me DF>lJUID ·DEI'OOITS AS OF ~ 25, J.963 
(Figures in nd.ll1ons or dollars) 
Reserve City- Member Banlts ·Country All 
Member Member Nonmember 
lie'J York Chicago other Banks . Banks Banks 
Gross Demand Deposits 26,J.74 6,629 53,lJ.2 52,202 l.38,ll.7 25,193 
., 
Jlcllan,ces Yith Banks 274 110 2,4o4 5,170 7,958 4,712 
CB.sh Items In Process· 4,612 910 8,2')1 2,441 l.6,26o 430 
Deductions (2 + 3) 4,886 1,020 io,701 7,611. 24,218 5,142 
Bet l)miand Deposits 
(1 - 4) .· : 2.l.,288 I 5,6<>9' 42,411 44,591 ll3,899 20,051 
Required Reserres 
@ l.8.3 Fer Cent 3,896 1,026 7,761 a,160 20,844 3,669 
Cash in Vnul.t 303 57 l,137 2,164 3,661 1,139 
Net P.equired Reser.1es 
(6 - 7) 3,593 969 6,624·· 5,996 17,l.83 2,530 
Actual Reserve With -
, Federal Reserve Banks 
December 25, 1963 3,872 ' 997 7,o89 4-,818 l.6,776 
D1.ff erence Over (+~ Under (- + 219 + 28 + .465 -1,178 - 4o7 -2,530 
. ,, 
-
All 
:Banks 
J.63,310 
12,670 
l.6,690 
29,36o 
133,950 
24,513 
. 4,800 
19,713 
J.6,776 
- 2,937 
Source: l3onrd of Governors ~ the Federal, Reserve System, "Assets and Liabilities ot All Banks in the United -
States, 11 No. J. 4., December 25, 1963. 
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similarly reduce member banks' deposits. Thie reduction in deposit 
liabilities of banks would reduce their required reserves by $0.7 billion. 
A net increase in legal reserve requirements as 1Di1cated above would 
probablY have to be ottset by massive purchases in the open market by 
the Federal Reserve. Just whnt amount ot purchases would be necessary 
18 difficult to determine. 
Reserve citybankS would gain considerable tree reserves. 
Table 7 indicates that Nev York city banks would enjoy a gain ot $279 
million in free reserves while Chicago banks would gain only one-tenth 
as much. Other reserve city banks would gain $465 million in free 
reserves. The increase in required reserve for !:,!! members reflected 
by this teble is not particu.larly meaningtul. It zmrely results tram 
our using the annual average ratio ot 18.3 per cent instead ot the 17.9 
per cent vhich actually prevailed on December 25, 1963. The more 
important aspect ot this illustration is the effect upon the classes 
ot banks. It is interesting to note, however, that a chunge of only 
four-tenths of one per cent yields a $400 million increase 1n require-
ments for member banks. Perhaps.this result illustrates the d1tticulty 
of using changes in reserve requirements as a contro.cyclicnl tool. It 
should be pointed out that these figures are totals and averases; there• 
fore, they conceal the extreme cases. 
The CMC Eftect--Virginiu 
It has been convenient to group Virginia banks into ~ 
classifications tor two reasons: (1) these be.nks are "closer to home" 
and.the effects upon various sizes indicate to a degree ettecte upon 
various individual banks with which we are temiliar, and (2) banks must 
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be grouped according to size vhen one wishes to apply tbs Heller graduated 
! i 
requirements. ' For this latter reo.aon the groupings are the same tor 
I 
both uniform (~c) end gradunted rese~e (Heller)-nOctl.Ya"i;: i Member o.nd 
nonmember Virginia banks are grouped o.ccord.ing to: (1) banidi with more 
: 
than $100 m1ll1on in~ d~ deposits, (2) banks with more thlin $5 
" 1l 
m1111on but no: more than $ioo million in net demands, and (3) banks with 
i ; .. - . ~ ~ •. -
'I 
$5 million or 'iess 1n net demands. Vember banks will be desisna.ted· in 
descending order as groups:1, 21 end 31 nonmembers will be called groups 
I 
I 
A and B. : The~ is no nonmember Virginia bank with deposits; of $100 
mill1on or more. --- -
ii I l 
' . i ; 
Table 8 indicates that, on the average, the three, largest and 
' ! 
, i .. I 
the 39 medium-sized bank& Would lose a substantial emount ot tree reserves 
I 
i, 
per bank. The· l4o smnll member banks would lose an insignificant amount 
. I 
' ' 
of reserves. Within the- llitter sr0up; bOwever, tbare-·would be large 
,; I i 
variations de~nding on th~ proportion of time deposits held by.each p i : 
banlt. The loss indicated tor the larger Virginia banks would ~ 
' i . : .. 
depend upon tilne deposit pi-oportions. More important, some ot these 
! 
-~ I·. - -- ---· --- --- --- -- -·-··--- -·-- -- -·· ----
banks would lose a tremendous amount of their correspond.ent'depoaits 
: I 
:i . i . 
needed by nonmember Virginia bank& to establish reserve balances unier · 
i; • : : 
the new law. There is IX> published information to indicate! which 
,'." - - -· - . . . .. . .... - .. -- - ··-· -·-- ··- ---- - - ·-1 
Virginia b~1 wou1d be ha~st hit by lqss ot correspondent balc.nces. 
' ' • I 
' ; 
Indeed a great: deal ot the· nonmembers' balances would be prc;>bably w1 th-
i: . . . . I 
dra;m from New York city be.nksJ some would be taken from Waehington, D. c. 
' ' ! 
I 
banks. It is sate to assume that the larger Richmond, Norfolk., ~nd 
, , . . . I 
Roanoke bankS '.yould be the; most a.treated by withdrawals ot correspondent 
i 1 ! ' . i 
balances resulting from imPosition ot uniform reserve requirements 
; ' 
! i 
againSt nonmember Virginia: banks• 
--l •·.' 
w 
TABLE 8 
liPPLIC.ATION OF UNIFORM RF.SERVE REQUIR.ENENrS TO VIRGINIA ME){8lm BANKS FOR RESERVE PERIOD ENDED DmFMBER 25, 1963, 
AfiD TO vmaIBIA NONMEMBER BANKS Fm STATJ!M.Em' DATE D}!l;EMBEft 28, 1962·- --_-
BASED Ul'ON J.8.3 Plll CEUI' REQUIREME?lr AGAINST Nm' Dawn> DEPOOITS ONLY'. 
(lilDOunts in tb:>usunds or dollars) 
.. I Daily FroJected ., 
•- L •- -- - - • 
--·- - -- . 
- --- ..... ·-···--- -
__ Average 
··-----
Required 
Aggreg3te -Reserve-- - ·· - Actual... ---- - Reserves· ·· - -- -----
Virg1nie. Net DemDnd 0: l.8.3 Required Required 1~ver..ige 
:Member Danks Number Deposits Per Cent Reserve (Difference) Per Bank 
Group l. B<lnks ·· 
(More than $100 million 
in net demand deposits) 3 565,031 l03,4oo 98, TI5 + 4,625 l,542 
Group 2 :&.nks. ·. · · · -·-
($100 million or less .. 
but more than $5 mUlion 
in net demand deposits) 39 728,293 133,278 121,057 +12,221 313 
.. 
-
' Group 3 Benke · ' -· I - . 
·- - - -- -- -·- - -- -
... 
- -·- - - - -- - - ··- ~- -- - ·- -( $5 m1llion or less 
in net demand deposits) J.42 309,744 56,683 55,281 + 1,402 10 
Totu.l 
-
l.84 l,6o3,o68 293,361 -275,l.13 +l.8,248 99 
Computed from: Report forms EK 246, ''Reserve Status Computation" (uccounting files of Federal Resel"V'e Bunk 
ot Richmond, Bank. Accounts Department, December 25, 1963). 
TAELE 8--continued 
.. 
. .. Projected 
Required 
.. 
P.ggregate Reserve Average 
.. 
Virginia Net Demand 0 l.8.3 Amount 
Jfonmember Banks Buniber Deposits Per cent Per Bcnk 
. 
. Group A Banks · .· . 
· {$l.OO million or less ·· 
but more thnn $5 million 
in net demand deposits) l3 164,411 30,o87 2,314 
'· Group B l3anks ,.. 
" ~ . ( $5 million or less in net dem:mcl de:Posits) · 86. 150,381 zr,520 320 
. 
... 
.. 
.. Totul 99 314,:792 57,6o7 582 
. Computed .tram: Commonwealth of Virginie•, 1962 /...nnual Report o'f the Bureau of :Bnnking, Stute 
Corporation Commission, i9E>3. · 
,-
75 
' ~Th~ V1rg1nia ~ia, . like the one conaorDing the entire <. 
United States, indicates.that &Qlle tuirly sizable dislocations might 
take.place throush nomneniber banks.withdrawing depQsita trom member 
banksJ ~.some extensive open mark.8t operations. would be. necossary •. · · 
Probably, uniform requirements are desirable in the long run, but .some. 
other scheme ,;that v1ll. avoid the transitional. problems 1n the Wlif'orm 
requirement plan would be preferable. This seems the chief' ioori t 1n the 
graduated reserve requirement proposal advocated by the Heller Committee. 
The Heller Et'fect--United States 
The grad\18~ed. reserve proposal has been studied in.terms ot 
September, 1961 reports ot condition by Mr. Lewis N. Dembitz, Division 
' ', ' 
of Research and Statistics ot the Board ot Governors ot the Federal 
Reserve System. Mr. Demb1tz hns generously offered to allov use of' the 
data trom this unpublished study. 
The graduated requirements suggested by the Beller Committee 
are: 7 per cent against the first $5 m1111on or net demand deposits, 
l2 per cent against the next $95 JD1ll1on~ run 16-l/2 ¥er cent ngainst 
the net demand deposits above $100 million. Uniform requirements--as 
noted earlier-·woul.d'pose en immense problem tor the group ot banks (and 
their correspondents) vbicb would move f'rom nonmember to member bank 
status under termeot the CMC rec0mme1Xlation.1· ·~ etfect of the' gradu-
ated. requirements ·on these be.nks,.vhich incidentally would retain non:.. 
m.ember--status tmder·the·Heller proposal, would probably be smaller 
. \. . .· f .. ,,, . • .. 
. . . -.· ; .lxt· ~ust ~ ~~ 1n 1111.nd that the Heller Conmittee reconmend.ed 
equal reserve clasoification o:t 8ll. 1.Jlaured. be.DkS except ae to aize; -
the CMC rec9Jllllencled tull membership 1D the Federal. Reserve System. 
) ··~ t. 
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but tbia 18 pro'bl.emat1cal. The toll.owing table talten from the Demb1 tz · 
material. shows the ettects on various size groupings· 01' banks. · Thi• · ' 
illustrates the gentle progression in requiremnt percentages as the 
demand deposit size groups 1ncrease.l This is in contrast to tbe oharp 
4-l./2 per cent differential. provided b;r the present reserve cit;r-country 
requirements. 11, ' 
TABLE 9 
GRADUATED lm>ERVES•·PERCENTAGES 01,, Br DOO\ND DEPOOITS2 .. • ·." 
' . ·, 
Net DemaM Deposits 
... ,(Millions ot dollars] 
Up to 5 
'.:"I ' 6 8 
10 
20 
50 
100. 
. 120 
150 
200 
500 
.. l,000 
5,000 
' . 
-.. ·---···-··· --···-- -- -~-~- ~~ ..... "- ·-"·--·- .. -· 
.. ·! 
Required Reserves . 
As a Percentage ot 
Net Demand Deposits 
7.0 
7.8 
·8.9 
9.5 
10.8 
11.5 
' . ' 11.8 
12.5 
. ; .t. ' 13·3 
14.l 
15.6 
l.6.o 
16.4 
•' .l' 
1
• •• " ·Mr~ Dembitz bae~s bis analysis ~n September 21;; 1961, con-
. ' . 
dition re:Port de.ta~ 
.. ,•,) 
~re . t~ 90 :Per . cent or th~. nonmember bruw would be subject 
laeserve' required egtiinat t'ime deposits, presently in effect··· 
tor member banks, would presumn:a>!y ~e-~xteDded to nonmember banks at the 
present tour per cent rate. · · · · ·· ,_ · ' - · .· . 
. ~ .. -·,,·-······ .,~lavis .H. Dembitz, ''Graduated Reserve Requirements" (unpublished 
staff paper, Board ot Governors of the Federal Reserve S;rs tem, June 4, 
1963) P• 4~ · 
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net demn'Qdaot more then $100 million. The following table illustrates 
tbe:number ot nonmember banltsaa:l pr0110rtion ot total net· demand. deposits 
in.· each s1ze category. 
TABLE 10 
. IliSURED NONMI!MBER BANKS CLASSIFIED BY AMOUNl'S 
OF THEIR NE!' D:EW.ND DEPOOITSl 
.. '· ', 
Under $5 million 
$5 mill.1on to 
$100 million 
~er $100 milli':>n 
Total 
Number 
Banks 
~,356 
639 
: ; 
Total Net 
Total Demand . 
DePoeits Deffisits 
(Billions ot doars) 
. l.8.8 8.8 
14.9 7.8 
i .: 
2.4 i.·4 
- -
.. 36.0 
· 18.o 
Number Member 
Banks in Same 
Size Class 
4,218 
l,761 
153 
6,132 - . 
'; 
As in the case ot the preceding discussion ot the.CMC proposals, 
. 
it is assumed that nonmember banks would establish their reserve balances 
by dro.ving down en equ.a.J. amount of correspondent balances. Actuall.Y' some 
\ 
i" •. ,,. .• ,• .. , 
might .. draw down J!X)re than enough to establish reserves with the central 
. . 
•. · '• ! 
bankJ they might wish to become members and establish .2!;!;, their clearing 
tundS with the Federal. Resel'V'e~ On the other band, ·six per cent of the 
nomnember banks in September, 1961-WOUl.d have held sutticiettt vault aaab 
balances to meet tbe Heller required.· reserve. Thus, they might not have 
withdrawen e:ay corres}X>Zldent bal.allces. 
1.: . . .. . , The l)ambitz atuiy reveals that even a1'ter dedu:ting :tram corre-
spondent ba.laDcea ot nonmember banks· an· amount suttiaient, to meet the ._ 
i Ibid., p• 6. 
-
I_ 
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impact o~ the Heller reserve, 'more then t\ro .. thirds ot the nomnembers 
WOuld &till have equal. or greater COITeSpondent bale.nee& than tbs medinD 
bfllancea held by member btlnks in comparable size croui»1n8s~ The next ' ., 
table reveal.8 the average correspondent balances . ·which Would." have been 
held by member anf nomnember banks in the varloU.s size group1ngs otter 
deduction ot omounts necessary to satist,Y the nonmembers' newly required 
:reserves on tiiDe and net demand deposits. 
TABLE 11 
· · . ; AVERAGE CORRmPONDE?fl' .BALANCRs. (DUE FRa.t BANKS) 
HEL'.l BY MEMBm .AND NONMamm BANKSl 
.-:. · · (Thousands of dollars) 
.Benk'She 
(Total del,X?Sits2 
Under $2 million $ 2·3.million 
$ 3-5 ti 
t ~:Io: . :: . $ l0-20 ·It' ·, 
$ 20-50 If .. 
'50-100 'If 
$100-500 ,, ·~ 
OV'er $500 '' .. 
" ,· ~ I • ! . • 
Held by Member l3anks . 
150 
240 .. 
. 334 
.. 478· 
627 
. 949 
1,871 "' 
3,771 
8,l.18 
17,982 
.Held.by Nonmember Banks 
· After· Deducting 
Reserve Requirement 
157. 
292 
' 407 . 
... 56o 
'703 
. 958 
1,349. 
2,046 
i,367 
6,780 
While the effect or losing correspondent balances to the Federal 
. ~ ) , . ' . 
Reserve might be considered injurious. to the member banks, the ettect, ot .. 
> • • .# •• " ~- " ' • - - ' 
the Heller.requirements upon nonmembers. would not be aa drastic e.s one 
'·. ' ' .. '. . 
might suppose. Tvto-tb1rds •.rould. have mo.re than. enough correspondent . 
~ - , - ~ . ' - . . . ., ' ' . . . . , '· 
balances, if member banks ot comparable size can be said to have enough, 
~v;~"dt~r .. impos1tion of the new requirements. The remaining one-third 
l . 8 ~·1 P• • 
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nonmember banks in e.lJ. but a fev instances, perhaps the largest, would 
have a choice ot paring balances due from banks below ''normal.'' levels or 
liquidating earning assets. Mr. Dembitz etatea that 1t this entire group 
of nonmember banks (one-third the total number of nonmembers) ·•ere to 
require balances vith other commercial banks equa1 to the median emount 
held by member banks of' comparable size, the amount of earning assets 
driven to liquidation would be only about $600 million or tvo per cent 
ot ull nonmember banks• earning assets •1 
What ot the effect upon member banks? The tallowing is a 
summe.r;r adapted ma.inly froxn the Board stud,y12 
Group l Banks 
Net :Delnllnd Dapcsits More Than $100 Million: 
Reserve City Banks -- A reduction o£ $4-3/4 million would benefit 
each of these benks. This is der111ed f'ran a reduction or $250 
thousand on the first $5 million (f'ive per cent) of their net 
demand deposits plus 11 4-1/2 per cent reduction on the first $100 
million. Losses of correspondent balances by reason of nonmembers' 
establishment of legal reserves would :probobzy cancel this gain. 
Dembitz f'otmd that $10-l/2 billion in Q...:iposits due to correspondent 
banks were held by the 228 reserve city banks in September, 1961. 
He estimates that an aggregate of $800-900 million vould probably 
be transferred by nonmember correspondents to their reserve eccounts 
ut Federal Reserve Ba.nkS from their accounts v1th reserve city 
banks. This loss of reserves would approximate the $816 million 
2Ibid., PP• 9-12. 
-
I. 
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gain in reserves afforded b.r the··reduction 1n requirements on their 
net demand deposits~ The above is based upoti aeaulllptione that 
'Withdrawals among member bnnks of this size would be·proportiono.J. 
to these banks' tOte.ls ot bal.Rnces due to other bnnks J ·end non-
members vould transfer to the Fed only· tO the extent that such .. ·· 
transfer. would not ·reduce their correspondent be.l.ances· belov tliose 
held by member be.nka ot comparable size. 
Countg Banks -- These 31 largest country banks voul.d have increu.ses 
in their resenre requirements. As country banks they presently 
are subJect to a l2 per cent requirement on net demands, but the 
. - ' ' '. J 
Heller proposul would subject a portion ot these deposits (over .. 
$10? million) to a 16-l/2 :per cent req~ement. 'llle study estimates 
a total increased resenre ot $110 million aP,Plicablo to these banks; 
. . 
also they would lose about $15 million in Withdrawals ot bal.ances 
by nonmember correspondents. However, $60 million ot the increase 
in reserve would apply to nine country banks which would have become 
reserve «!1ty bnnkS under the .Federal ReserV-e· Board' a clnssitication 
published 1n March, 1961.1 
Group 2 Bank8 
Net Dems.nd DePoaits More Than $5 Million to $100 Million: 
·Reserve City Banks .,;. These be.nks would gain reductions on the first 
$5 million of their net demand deposits equal to 9•1/2 per cent or 
$11-75,000 each plus 4-l/2per cent on the amount ot net demand&.vbich 
exceed $5 million. However, losses ot correspondentbalances by 
reason ot nomember banks' eatablisbmen:t ot J.egal reserves vould 
...... 1n all likelihood cancel out a large portion ot this gain • 
. ; ~ ,: . . ; 
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Country Banks -- 'l'his group ot bankS vould gain reductions on the 
first $5 milllon ot net demand deposits eq~ to.five, per _cent or 
; .:_; . '·' 
$250,000. The requirement ot l2 per cent would remain equal. to 
' . ~ . ,,, :. 
the present one for the net demands which exceeded $5 million. 
' ' ' . ''.. ' 
An aggregate reduction ot $l.8o million vould be ottset by loss ot 
.·. 
' .. \ ' ' . ·- ... ~ 
about $75 mill1on in correspondent balances to nonmembctra establish-
ing Federal. Reserve accounts. 
'' 
Group 3 Banks 
Net Demn.nd Deposits $5 Million or ~ss: 
h. Reserve City Banks -- !L'here ore none in this category • 
. Country Banks -· These banks would gain reductions in legal require-
ments equal to five per cent~ tive-tvelfths the present level of 
12 per cent. .The fol.lowing is a summary adapted. f'rom tbe Dembitz 
. conclusion:~ . 
. TABLE l2 
, F.STIMATED EFF~TS ON CLASSES OF BANKS m UNITED STAT.m FRCM 
.APPLICATION OF REI·I.ER C~ GRADUATED RmERVE REQUiruMENTS 
. (/illX>unts in milliollB ot dollars) . : ..,~ . 
.Assets: 
Reserve vith 
F. R. Bank 
Due trom 
·· ·· ·· .. other banks 
• ·. •1 Earning Assets ·· 
Liabilities: 
'.:l: Due to .banks .. 
. ,, ....... . " .. . " ~ . 
. Thirty-one 
Nonmember Reserve City Most Country~ · wrgest 
Bank Member Banks Member Banks Country Banks 
+1,700 < - 800 + 100 
-1,000 
. ,, , 
" 
.... 700 ., + 750 
- 125 
- 8oo j' - 100 - .. 15 
1nemb1tz1 loc. cit., PP• 13-14. 
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. 'l'be Beller Ettect--Virgini,a. 
The writer has followed a somewhat ditterent approach in the 
application of graduated. reserve require~nts against Virginia banks. 
First, the impact of correspondent nonmember bwlks' vithdravals from 
member banks is not indicated.. It would be ditticult to determine this 
'• ' 
in a l11Uited. area because some balances would move into Virginia from 
. .. . ' .. 
other statess also, some of the reserve city banks in Virginia might 
lose balances to out-of-state nonmembers. Secondly, the ettects upon 
- . . -· 
reserve city banks as opposed to country banks is not shown; the groupings 
/ ' " 
as to size seem more appropriute 
Member Bunks 
,, :' • , : ; ' ! . ', 
Country bD.nk reserve position reports tor the t'Jo-veek period 
~ December 251 1963 .vere used. These are canputer.:.prepo.r~d h-c»:n 
' ' 
member banks' reports of deposits Wld required reserve. They were 
.. I,, ... , •. 
divided into the three groups according to da1.l.y average net demand 
. ' . 
de,p0sita 'over the two-week 'period. In the case of reserv~ city bftnks, 
one-week reports vere uti.tized·e.m de.:i.iy averages obtained. There are 
r ·,• · ' r. _,, ·' t \ ·; 
five reserve city banks 1n Virginia. ivo r.re in group. .lJ three are in 
,, 
~ . ; '· . . ~ . 
group 2. ··There are 179 country banks in Virginia. One is in group 11 
36·~~~ 1hi grOuP 2,'and 142 e.re ~group 3.l 
l . ' ' ~ 
The one country bank in group l is a state-wide branch banking 
~ya~~ Witli ,almost $200 inulion in net.demand. deposits subject to Only 
. ,') '·,' ., 
~ J2 per cent reserve requirement. It bus no office 1n the state's only 
reserve city. One of the group 2 reserve city banks confined. to the 
riit/ot Richmond has net demaDd deposits or only about .$18 million. 
,,\_. ! 
,/lf"llW•.;._,, ·•«~·""' _,. 
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It is subject to a J.6-l/2 per cent requirement. No better evidence could 
be found. for the proponents ot a change in the present aystem ot res~rve 
'i 
requirements for member ba.nks ot the Federal. Reserve System. i Draetia 
changes 1n these tvo bnnks' reserve levels would take place as vill be 
noted ~1 renewing Table 9 ubove. 
The ap~cu.ble Heller percentages were computed from the three. 
' ! 
groups 1 :net demand. deposits in Table 13. For example, there are. 39 banlts 
' i 
in group 2J a seven per cent required reserve was calculated against the. 
ti.rat $5 million of each of these banks resulting in $13.650 million 
' . 
($5 mill1on x. 39 bt-.nks x 7 per cent) required reserve. The remaining 
. ' 
net demand de;x>sito were subjected to u 12 :per cent required reserve, 
; .. 
) . ·j 
producing $631995 million. The total, $17.645 million, was ~o~~i 
. i ' 
vith the da1l.;r. average required reserve actually in effect tor the period 
. I . 
ended ~~embe~ 25, 1963 for these 39 banka: $94.,649 .million. The ~ault 
; 
was a release ot about $17 million. This is misleadillg, however, since 
! 
36 ot thf!se banks would uniformly huve.tbeir reserves reduced by $250 
thousand. Tbe three Richmond bankS presentlyclaas1tied as reserve a1t1 
banks wose :cet demand deposits are lees than $100 million 'vould enJdy 
. , I 
a reduction ot $8 million in required reserve, almost halt the release 
'\ 
tor this entire group of 39 banks. 
Again it is necessary to point out that we don• t ,.kno'" what· 
ettect correspondent nonmember vitbdravals would have; certainly it would 
. . ' 
~ .gl"ea;tly'' change tho pict~e ot a significant :Potential. tor grea~er 
earning nssets on the. pert ot the' group 2 bank.a' ( especilll.lY those three ·. · .. 
bCnks 1xl Richmond} 'a.ftorded by the Heller requirementa. 
Nonmember Banks 
'l'he 1962 P.nnual R~rt of the Bureau ot Ba.nk.ixy51 State Corpo-
ration Commission, commonvee.J.tb ot Virginia shows condition of each i 
~ 
T.Am.E l3 
•'"1 «.,) ~ATiolf (p ''ffEI.Tm" C<MU'.1.1'.L'U GRAWATED RESERVE ~UIREMlmre TO VlRGIBIA :rm.mm BJ\NKS 
FOR RESERVE FmIOD ENDED DECEMBm .25, 1963 
(.Amounts 1n thousmxls or dollurs) 
-
. 
· P..ggregate Net Fro Fo.rma ?.resent Amount or 
Demand Deposits Required Required. Reserves 
lhil.y Average Reserve Reserve ReleMsed 
Group l Danks (3) . 
Bet DemaQ! J)Jposits More Thnn $100 MUlion: 
J\mount subject to 7 per cent requirement -
$5 milllon x 3 banks . . 15,000 J.,050 
Jt.mount subject to l2 per cent requirecent -
$95 million x 3 bunks · 285,000 34,200 
. · /11DO&mt aubJect to lf:,..J./2. per cent 
requirement - reminder 265,031 43,730 
..... 
Total G~ 1 Bet Damond Dei:osita 565,031 78,980 85,030 6,050 
Group 2 Banks (39) · · · · 
Det .D:ml;.nd n,.POB1ts more than $5 m1l.l.1on: .. 
' 
. ft.mount subJect to 1 per cent requirement - . 
-:. $5 mill 1on x 39 bnnka 195,000 13,650 .. •,' •-. 
PJIIOUilt subject to l2 per cent requirement .. · 
.. 
·-remu1nder 533,293 63,995 
-
.. 
Total· Group 2 Bet Demem Deposits 728,293 77,645 94,649 17,004 
Group J :Banks (142) . ·. . 
Bet Del:l.<ind Deposits $5 Millian or_ Less: . 
'. .. Total. Group 3 .Bet Demend Deposits - .. 
SubJect to 1 J:er Cent Requirements 309,,744 .· ~682 37,169 15,487 
al-and. Total All ~OUPa (J.84) l,6o3,o68 178,307 216,848 38,541 
Daily 
Avert1ge 
Reserves 
Rele~sed 
Fer Bonk 
2,017· 
. 
436 
' l.09 
Computed. f'rom: RepOrt; f'oms BK 246, "Reser-re Status C0mputut1on" (accounting files.of.Federal Reserve Bank of 
Ricbmolxl, Dank. Accounts Department, December 25, J.963). 
Virginia state nonmember bunk. Although ~ del:la.nd deposits ure not 
indicated, each bank's gross demand deposits were considered to be five 
times deductions (co.eh items in process of collection and balances due 
from banks); in other words, net demands were figured to be tour-fifths 
gross demw:Jds. This is based upon ratios fouild in Tnble 6 between non-
member bank totals in the United States. 
The 99 nonmember b~s vere o.lloca.ted either to group A or 
group B on the basis of net demand. deposits for each bank. Group A 
inclUdes l2 nonmember Virginia bunks whose net demunds vc.:re more than $5 
million (there are none with as much as $100 million) as of December 28, 
1962. Group 23 consists ot the remaining 87 nonmember banks ·«hose net 
demand.a are less than $5 million. 
Table 14 illustrates the effect of appl.ying 7 per cent uIXl 
l2 per cent respectively to the first $5 million of net demund deposits 
ot nomnember bunks, and to the exceos above that amount for the l2 banks 
affected by the higher requirement. Aleo, time deposits ot these 99 banks 
ae of December 28, 19(52 has been aggregated and e 4 per cent requirement 
levied pro f'orma. 
Aggregate required reserves for Virginia. nonmember banks under 
the Heller proix>sals would amount to about $38·1/2 million--almost 
exactly the c..'UOunt of reserves released to Virginia member banks (ref'er 
to Table 13). In Virginia, ste.te nomnember banks are presently subject 
to a 10 per cent requirement on demand deposits end a 3 per cen·c require-
ment on time delJOsits. These requirements muy be met by either balances 
with del)Ository banks or vault cash (refer to Table l). On D!cember 28, 
1962 all l.65 state banks held $284 million in cush end balances with 
other banks· Probably half or more of these primary reserves belonged 
to nonmembers. 
~ 
TABLE 14 
AWLICATIOlf OF 'JOO.I.ER ' CCJ.OCl'l'rEE GRADUATED R&SFBVE REQUIR.E2.fENTS TO VIRGINIA Nomm.mER BANKS 
FOR ST.AT:EMENT DATE DEX!EMBER 28, 1962 
(.Amount5 1n thousands or dolli..rs) 
Required. 
Required Reserve Pro Forma 
Aggregate Reserve .Aggreg&te Time Tot cl Aver~,ge 
!let Demand Net DeID!.!nd Time Dei:osita @ Required Reserves 
Deposits !);?posits Deposi t.s 4 Per Cent Reserve 
Group A Banks (13) 
Net Dein!.tnd. Deposits More Th ·,n $5 
Million But Less Thnn $l.OO Mil.lion: 
Amount subject to 7 per cent 
requirement - $5 million x l.3 banks 65,000 4,550 
Amount subject to l2 per cent ' . -
requirement - remainder 99,4ll ll,929 ' 
Tot.al. Group A Net Demt.-tnd Deposits 164,4ll l.6,479 ll.4,453 4,578 21,057 
. 
Group B Bcnks (86) 
Net Demand Deposits $5 Mill.ion or Less: 
-Total Group B Net Dem.Bnd Deposits 
Subject to 7 Per Cent Requirement 150,381 10,527 180,430 7,217 17, ~,44 
Grand Tot'Jl All Groups (99) 314,792 27,oo6 294,883 ll,795 38,8oi 
-
Computed from: Commonwealth of Virginiu, 1962 Jl..nnual Re;port of the Burenu of Banking, St~-:.te Corporation 
Cormlission, 1963. 
Per Bank 
·, 
. J.,620 
,. 
-. 
206 
392 
87 
In conclusion, it seems safe to assume that Virginia nomnember 
banks could easily afford the price ot the·Heller recOlllllendations. This 
would result 1n same shitting ot correspondent balances tran member 
banks' depos1toi·1es to the Federal Reserve. However, sane would cane 
from out-of-state banks a.Di in maey instances nomnembers' vault cash 
would constitute a major part ot the required reserve. Member banks, 
except tor a very tew1 .vould probably eajoy an opportunity to in~rease 
their earning assets under the new requi~ta • 
.. -.\ 
'· CBAP.rER VII. 
. . ·• 
A J?ROPOSAL FOR CIWDE IN ~ERVE SEl'l'WIBNT PERIODS1 
The.March, 1964 issue of the Journal ot Finance contains an 
article by Albert H •. Cox end Ralph F. Leach recommending that res~rve 
settlement periods for member banks be lengthened and staggered. Mr.' Cox 
is Secretary of the Bankfng and. Financial Research comnlittee ot the: ·· 
Americen Bankers .Association. Mr. Leach is Senior Vice President and 
Treasurer, V.orge.n Guaranty Trust COZll};lany, New York. Correspondence 
with Mr. Cox'resulted 1n nn early enough look at the manuscript to add 
this chapter. 
This is an imp:>rtant piece or work 1n that it lays open to 
inquiry anothe~ apparent ;,historicnl accident. •i It BlJ8gests that present 
reserve settlement periods tor member benks pose operating ditfi~ulties 
tor themJ and, worse yet,· the reserve settlement procedure interteres. 
'With private security and money markets by cauauig ~ecessaey "defensive" 
Ol;>en Jll!lrket operations. It ia prop0sed by· Y.essrs ~ Cox and Lee.ch tbnt 
member bankS be permitted to average required. reservee aver ~-one month 
period and that reserve periodS be arranged so as·to have sane ot the 
banks' period& ending on each ot the first four Wednesdays in each month. 
In other words the reserve settlement periods would be lengthened to· 
.,. lAlbert B. Cox, Jr., and Rc.U.ph F. Leach. "Defensive Open 
Market Operations and the Reserve Settlement Periods ot Member ~·" 
kn. unpublished paper, :Dlcember, 1963. · · · · · ·· · ·· 
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one month 8lld staggered so eis to permit one-fourth ot the banks to: 
settle on each of the first tour Wednesday's of the month. .The proposo.l 
1a beyom the scope ot tbia paper and.1 moreover, there has not.been 
au.tticient time to evalUllte it adequately •. However, becaUBf.t this pro-. 
pose.l seems to represent an original. s.l'ld logical approach to o.n important 
pba.ae ot ,\'"eserve mechanics, it is considered &.l.togetller appropriate to 
Offer here a tentative evaluation. 
The Federal Reserve Act prescribes minimUD ba.l.s.nces to be 
' " ,) 
held by member banks with the Reserve banks. Ho-.rever, it leaves to the 
Federal Reserve Board authority to change reserve requirement percentages 
within limits and to prescribe such rules end regulationa as it JDJJ.Y deem 
necessary to.effectuate the purposes ot establishing member bank reserve 
requirem~ts.l One ot the Boo.rd's rules prescribes that detic1enc1ea 
:µi reaerv-e bel.o.nces of reserve city 'banks shall be computed on the basis 
Qt dnilg average ca.sh and·balances with tho iteserve benk over.a.one week 
period.. Deficiencies ot banks not in re.serve cities shall be computed. 
on a biweekly basa.2 In other words, fl, country bank may be deficient 
in required reserves over o. substantie.l part of a two veek period Just 
so l.ong as he 18 able to·"e.vera.ge out," or offset these de.Uy detic.iencies 
vi th excess reserves in other de.ye. ot the. period.~ 
Orig1nally, each ot the twelve Reserve banks spec1t1ed their 
own computation period&. one assessed penalties against deticienciea 
_ lrederul. Reserve Act (38 .Stat. 270, e.s amended; l2 u.s.c. 461, 
'462, 462a-l, 462b, 464, 465) • 
· '. - 2' 1Reguliat1on n: . Reserves CJf. Member ·Banks·,''. as amen:ied effective 
Janum:y 291 19641 Washington • 
.. r.·. .; • • ' ' . " ·~· ~ • . • ~ -
3.No member banker rrw.y overdraw: his baJ.ance at eny time, however. 
,as they occurred on any individunl. day. Three banks permitted their 
: membe~ to average aJl3 def'icieno1es or ottaet them with: excess roseIYea 
· over ~ entire month. . Some banks di.tferentil.l.ted between country banka , 
and city banks as to settl.ement periods. It wen' t until 1923 .. that th\!· 
.various Reserve banks uniformly adopted the reserve settlement periods 
.., . ', 
recommended. by the Board, and. these were a result ot cQIDpx'OJDiGing the 
.various prticticea ot the Reserve banks. : These 1923 settlement periods 
were easent1a~ "tlbat we have today •. Messrs. Cox and. Leach point out 
,that mc~ymarket or monotary considerations were not ta.ken into.account 
, in 1923 or bef'ore.l Daily attention to bank reser1ee and money market 
.influence~ .ba.d not then come upon the scene• It is, tberetore1 . hard to 
disagref#.vith the contention that today's reserve settlemeat periods•• 
,Wftekly .for .reserve City and biweekly tor country banke-•bave JlO real 
monetary basis tor their establishment. The tact that so many practices 
~' < -~ ' ' ' ' " • • ' 
origina111 prevailed among the districts gives rise tQ suspicion that 
little ottent1:® was given to selection ot either the original practices 
01' ,the caupromise practice. vbicll pre\~uUs, today. · It might be argued 
that one to tvo weeks is long enough to permit.banks to e.djust·tbe1r 
reserves to the required balance, that eey longer period woul.d.eneourage 
, ; . ~ ' .... ' 
unwise i;shortter.m credit expansion, that city banks would .be more vulner-
. . ~·""·. . 
able to sudden cash outtlowe em. hence require. more attention to reserves 
. , 
~ a. liquidity standx:.<>int• Further,, 1 t might. be argued that the Federal 
Besene ... A.ct.implies ·banks must maintain l.egal reaenea .. ere?Y day and 
~t they may only withdraw or "obeck esa.inst" the required balance 
subject to the deficient reserv-e penalties. As noted earlier, liquidity 
'' ·'"''"''"'•~ >,.,, '"<~'°' •W ''- ~' ~· ' 
lcox and leach, op. cit., P• 4. 
91 
. . 
is ot minor importance in establiebing reserve requirementsJ rather, · 
DJonetnry mazWSement. is the p~iptl consi~ration. Therotore, :':i.t :inight 
be more' ProPerly.,aeked:. ho·,, wouid l~ngthening ·~s~rve Pe~iOds to oh~ month 
aftect·mon~~ ~~ht? The aiuj~er to this .is 'tl"le c~ of the thesis 
b; ce>X e.i:id Le~ch. ,. :·.: " . ~ '. : ' ' 
Today, the F~d.eral. ReserV"e Dunk of New York under direction 
of the Federal C>pezi Market .Committee. carries on open market oper~tions, 
the principai monei and credit control instrl.111ent or th~ ,.central. bnnk~ 
Many of the Nev York :Bank's' purchases and 'sales of United.States gov"em-
:· c '. ' ' ~ 1 ' ,.. . . ' ' ' . . ' . 
ment securities are defensive operations designed to ottaet .intra-monthly 
silings in factors e.tteating reserv-ee, e.g.j Federal Rose~ tlont or 
uncolle~ted checks. In the months April ~ough. September 1961~. gro~s . 
~to d.ey .chBnges 1n t~cto;s affect!~ reserve~ emounted to $14,'892 
ndiuon aupPlied and.' $141 937 miUion Witbdrnwn.1 · Thl.is, ~serves supplied 
• ' .; ~ ' . ' f 
throughout the six month period almost exactly equaled reserV"es with-
drawn. ·, These tactors increasing .or decreasing reserves excluded System 
~Pen market holdings, but ~luied. check 'tloat, currency in circ~tion, 
Treaaury deposit~ with Beserve barlks1 vault cash. in banks, required.· · 
reservea~·and otherf~ctOrs: .The largest ri~t change in tiny One month-~ 
September 1961--emount~ t~ minW:' $449 lllillion. The net tor the ~ix 
~hs vas only"Piusu $45 miluon ... · S'!m1'1.orly, :Fede~ Reserve S~tem 
OpGn ~rket ~dillgs · incr~~d.·· ~n b~e .·onl/ $669 million over the ' 
sh· ~th' period. •· · llowe~~r~ ~;s. p~hase~ ~kited tO $5, 601 tllld : 
gros~ ·ail.e~·~unted tO $4,938 over 'this :Per1oa.2 Obviolisly, therefore, 
't~ -.. ' '• 
\.'.,t " -
•,,' 
';~ 
·' "'' 2· ' ,,_.' . 
. . . Ibid. 
-
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Federal Reserve activitias in the goven:ment eecuritias J:JJUrkot are J.argal.y 
defensive in nature, apparently designed:to ofts<tt.tbe tluctuations in 
other .tactora attect1ng reaerves. Why does the Fed need to ongo.se in 
such defensive ·maneuvers? Messrs. Cox and leach e.naver .. this by saying 
that given the present le~t:-:i Of tiDle -tor settlement (one week in the 
case· Of ·the .·city. banltS) they are necessary to maintain stability in 
money market conditions. '!he Fed requires .that these bflllk& Bettle tor 
their l(?gal. reserves every week.end the Fed~ determine am otfaet 
the short term tluctUBtions in the factors ,which affect bank reserves. 
: ' ' '. -~ ' ' 
. {,,,. Check tloa:t;· 1n the ·United State• reaclles ito peak around the 
middle ot each month. ·Toward the end ot thermontb it declines sharply. 
It :reaultatran tha Beservebank.1 1 having po.seed credit. to its depositor 
m6mb6r banks JJ:Ore rapi~ t~ it receives credit fran .the dl"avee ~· 
This is dl.VJ to the Fed's policy ot el.we.ya grenting credit to ita deposi-
tors 1n two ~ or less ·vbil.e actual. collection· time TJJD,)" require as 
much as tour to aix days •. In a sense.it is e.n Ulogical practice and 
the f'lotlt which it creates tema to fluctuate rapidly, thereby compli-
cating mcmetar)" control •. Nevertheless, it encourages use ot .the JDOre . 
etticient colleation system which the central bank provides.· Thuat it 
perhaps encourages membership. Ot greater significance here is the tact 
that check tloe.t provides bank& with reserves •.... S:tnoe the .reserves thus 
aupplied. do~luctuete, tbe centro.l benk. must ~e.k.e d.etenaive,action to 
offset intra-monthly tluatuationa iJl check f'loe:t. .. The central bank must 
purClle.ie tor 1ta open·ma.rltet account Dftfll".inonth end.vh~n. tloat contro.cteJ 
otherrisel 'bankS:vould. have to liquidate short term·asaets.' It must 
··sell government securities e.t th& middle of the month to avoid bnnka 
with excess reserves investing too heavily. The stuizy states that 
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"• • • these otfsettillg operations prevent large tluct~t1ons in reserve 
,avaUe.b1l1ty and money rates ••• they help ate.b111ze the money market. 
, . . . , ' . ~ ' . 
;· ••... • the pattern 18 .clear, vitb the factors goiJl& one vey,. and the Fed 
the other, both ending the .month in appro:dmate balance.'.' .. 
A good deal ot the blame for the necessity of 1ntramon~, 
offsetting purchases an:i sales ot govermnent securities can be attached 
; ·' ·, ' 
to the short reserre settlemnt periods •. It banks were permitted to 
. . . ' ' 
.. average out, their required reserves over a one month period, the central 
~ ,, ' . ' ; ' . . . . 
bank vould.not need to take these.offsetting short term actions • .And 
. if' the central ~ank wer to stay out of the government securities market 
~ . , . ' . 
to ~_.sreater extent, the. short term money market would be. tree ot soma 
of its disruptive intluence. Furthermore,. With longer reserve periods 
:" " ' .. ' . ' ' 
the money market banks could pJ.e.n reserve utilization JDOre ettectivoly • 
.. " ,, , " 
,,. The common settlement.dates al.Bo eerve to impede a treer money 
market. For ex.ample, when excess reserves are nlativel.¥ larce, it ha.a 
. . ' ' . 
·r .. 
become e. tnmiliar pattern for the Federal funds rate to drop sharply· 
. '• ~· . -
,Just before C?Ountry bnnlt settlement ~Y•• This 1nstab1llty agnin arises 
trom. no real. difference in credit availability, but from the artit1c1al 
stimulus Of the common settlement .dates. . It stasgered setUement dates 
were permitted with banks' periods ending at ditterent times, their 
' ) ' \ ~ . ' . 
as:gregate n:se~-~· .· could be evenly appo~ioned over time. Om 
quarter .ot ~~ ~itY. and co~try b.~ ,in each Fe,der8:1 Reserve district 
'W'()uld settle eacb.w~, and settlement dates would be distributed e.mong 
the banks in each maJor city. These settlements vould be apportioned 
to each of tbe first tour Wedneada¥s 1n the month. Bo banka' reserve 
·perloda·w.ulif em 'Whenever e. tttth \fedncsde.y occurs (tour times a year). 
,;, . " 
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'l'his proposal. brings a fresh nev criticism to the mechanical 
rules by which com:nercia.l banks maintain their reserves. It provokes 
new thoughts about the necessity and purpose ot reserv-e requirements. 
It should dispel some ot the mystery about the mechanics ot the Fed 
"going to market'' by forcing the monetary theorists to come to grips 
with a monetary problem which the authors expose nm then ''solve" with 
a simple mechanical device. The most serious question.might be con· 
cerned with the degree ot 1m.pertection to result tram the reliance upon 
the.commerchlbanks to plan reserve needs over so long a period of time • 
. 
Might not they miscalculate end e.ctually accumulate even greater reserve 
d.Stic1enc1es or excesses over a month, such that f1na.lly--realiz1ng their 
positions--they might:exert a ma.gni.f'ied pressure on the money mo.ret 
themselwsT · · And·•Vorse yet·-might not they run the risk of incurring 
bUgereserve 'deficiencies o.m penalties levied by the centrn1 bank.? 
Also, 'precisely bow vould the bankS be divided into the tour groupsT 
would. orte. week of the m:>nth (as a time tor ending a settlement period) 
have more'.signiticance to·a given bonlt than another week? It so, would 
' . 
the bank have: E1'lJ¥ choice in selecting 1 ts particular closing week? 
·Messrs. Cox and Iae.ch anticipate e.nd answer other questions. 
They also Ulustrate their studJ' with daily reserve and "factors" charts 
which em:pl.y reveal: their thesis.1 . Tb18 is nn intereati:ng paper and one 
which· seem8 to :inerit a considerabJ.T greater amount ot study than is 
afforded in this short ch8.pter • 
• ~ .' 'J 
,, ·. ·: : · ::. ~: iin ~opinS tigm•es for the April-September, 1961 period. 
wb1ch are used in.the charts, tlle authors were assisted by.the statistical 
ste.tt ot the :Board of Governors. 
~ ,. 
•,_:: ,•, 
·., 
CHAPl'ER VllI 
CONCLUSION 
··.The dual role ot the centrol bank presents some difficulty 
to the student or money and banking. The Federal Reserve System must 
contribute aubstanti~ to the payments mechanimn in tbe United States. 
It.must also regulate the supply ot money and credit in keeping with 
national. output• Om function lies 1n tho field or administrative 
f'inanae and the other has tt.> do iii th economic policy. Seemingly, the 
two tunct1ons are separate, yet relationships between the central bank 
a:od commercial banks touch UJX>D both areas. Legal reserves are the buae 
tor monetary control. They a.re also used tor clearing purroses, end the· 
central bank• a policy ot granting credit through the payments mechanism 
affects the reserve base. The ''services" which tbe central. bank pertorms, 
e.g., check col.lection tor its members, are often thought of as a kin1. 
ot reward to a member bnnlt tor its having become a member and thereby 
established a nonearnillg reserve bal.ance. 
· · · · · It can eatel.y be stated that the central bank is essential for 
the pertormanae ot both ot these tvo tunctions. What does it need in 
the. vsy ot support through membership of the colll11erc1al banks'l Does it 
need. to ·exercise supervision am control over most of the nation's com-
-
merc1e.l banks tor purposes ot providing an effective payments mechanism? 
PrObably. · To provide an effective monetary control.? .Probably not. 
The point ot this discussion is not to provide knowledgeable enawers 
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:to these tvo question&J it is to draw a line between the tvo principal 
. k1m8 ot vor1t which the central. ba.nk performs, and to suggest tbe.t 
authority in one field should not be unnecessarily complice.ted by legis-
lation in tho other. For example, provision tor changes in reserve 
'requ1.rementa should not be made with an eye toward central bank services. 
Deserve requirements should be set primarily tor reasons· of monetary 
needs. Services eate.bliahed are presume.bly to improve the payments 
meobamsm. For this reason, a system ot Uni.term reserve requirements 
appl.:1.cabl.e to all ·creators ot loanable :tund.s will remove much of the 
discontent and misUDderstandi'lS vhich cloak.a present reserve requirements 
with cGnaiderat1ons o! compeneatory services. 
The student ie likely to be tempted to favor proposals which 
vUl aimP11f'Y the task of monetary control and eliminate the favored 
status of some tinancial institutions which seemingly do oot carry their 
share ~ reaponsibili ty tor modern money end bnnktng needs. Spec1:tico.lly 1 
there aeems little to COlllllend a geogrnpbice.J. or other.dee d.1tterent1ated 
reserve requirement. There .is good reason to suspect ·that monetary policy 
is complicated by the unknown distributive ef'tects of changes in bank 
reserves due to reserve differentials. 
At the sama time, it is unreasonable to demand that small unit 
.bank.I be forced to cease existence through \JXlbridled canpet1tion. It 
, 1s not requ:tred that banks be compelled to become members ot the Federal 
Deserve System or that states cease chartering banks. The Heller 
,recQJ!PIMtndation1 within the framework of the Federal-state batiking system, 
seems fair to nearly all classes or groups of commercial be.~. It 
recognizes Federal insurance as n criterion tor Federally established , 
·:.reserve ·requirements. It graduates requirements in keeping with 
:; 
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traditional. concepts or sue e.m velocity. Final.ly, 1t provides reduction 
1D requtrementa tor many banks. 
: . :. · ·:. What are tho chances ot amending the J'ederal Reserve Act en1 .. 
the .Banking Act ot 1935 along lines suggested in this pnperYl 
There seems to be little hope tor remedial action in the near 1'uture. 
Exhibit J., a l.etter tran Senator A. Willis Robertson, Chail'man; Camm1ttee 
on Eank1ns·and CUrrency of the United Sto.tea Senate, do.ted December 171 
1963,.,irJdiClated. to the vriter that no proposals have been presented along 
these ·line• since the 1959 legialo.t1on vas adopted. More recently, 
Senator Robertson.remarked: 
"With most financial institutions thriving axn vith tbl!ir · 
customers on the whol.e supplied with adequate cred1t, the 
.. . . need:.for substantial changes in the organization ot our 
.financial. institutions does not api;>ear great. Tbe long 
eatablisbed rules of a geme should not be changed unless 
am. until the need for change has been proved. 
,.'"' '•" 
< ,, ', 
' . ' ' 
''My besi tance to enter the areu ot change is further 
strengthened by the fact that the Congress ha.s other pro-
posals vhich are generally considered to be of far greater 
immediacy and ·importance, whatever one my ·think or their 
merits. 
11The banking proposals must compete tor the attention ot 
·· the Congress with such measures o.a the tax cut bill an:1 
the civil rights bill which tbe President baa placed e.t 
the top ot the list. ''2 ·. ·· : ' ·. : 
, . · .. _ ·;: .. As .regards the appropriate level at reserves against time 
depos1ta,. it aoe:ma mcessnry to establiah more empirical evidence to 
determine the nature ot these ;tunds. In the meantime, theor1e1 that 
t1me deposits are not money must l.ead to an assumption that these :0 
. :1irhese are .the laws presumed to be subJect to legislation in 
the event the Heller recommendations are adopted. · 
. : 
. ; ·: ... '" .:, 2,A.· w1u1s Robertson, ''Report ~n the Washinston Scene, II remarks 
betore the Convention of the Wisconsin Bankers Association, Milwe:ukee, 
Januar.Y 201 · 1964. · · · 
. 
reserve requirements ere not needed for monete.ey control. .Also,. adequate 
liquidity for these tunda' vithdrawal is obtained through maintenance of 
reserves againet Det demand de:901its, clearing balances• etteotive super-
vision, . and seconde.ry reserves. 
The proper level tor reserves·apinst·net demand de:posite ie 
the most elusive element in the "solutions" diecusaed here. Apparently 
.the reductions which havo . taken ple.ce 1n the last dee~ have not imJ>aired 
the central. ·bank.' s ability to regulate rxmey and credit. In Chapter II 
it waa found.that tbe less reserve reqUirements are, the greater leverage 
1a afforded• It ve.s. al.so round that aggregate clearing charges egainst · 
member bank :resarve balances ill the Ricbmond terr1 tor,y QJll)unt ·to 70 per 
~ of bal.ances over a three month period. One might conclude that . 
. banks·· need a sizable portion o:r what they now maintain. 1t they are to 
'\dth8taDi adverse alee.ring balances in the :form o:t checks draw upon 
them; cash W1thdre.valst etc. 
In a seDSe1 bank& e.ppcar to have a kind. C1t precautionary clemsnd 
far.llX>lley. It this approaches the present level. otreserve requirements, 
then further. reductions in. legal reqllirements vould. create excess reserves 
·eni monetary ·control would be canplice.ted. Changes in banks' reserve 
positions would then result trom chansing ca.eh needs more than tran 
·conscious moneta.rJ". aation • 
. ·- ·.Are. reserve requirements needed at all? Most _writing& examined 
in preparing. this paper assume that they are. The 1.mer1can B.:lnkers. 
Association reaoon is.ho.rd to assails legal reserves are necessary to 
act as a f'Ulcrum ngainst which the leverage, _ot monetary control can be 
exerted.l. Bowver, if monetary leverage becomes progressively greater 
': • '. .~ , .. <". 
1Nember Bank Reserve Requirements, op. cit., P• ll. 
aa .the legal reaerYe ratio 11 reduced, then without !& reqU1rementa a 
factor ot change af'tect1ng be.nk reserves would have an infinite effect 
on the money auppl\r. Surely this cannot be. There must be some other 
deterrent to infinite expansion ot the money·auppJ.y. It must be that 
bank8 have· a demo.n:l tor cash bole.nces or primary reaerves, awing not 
entirel,y to law but to instinct a.nd experience. k!Jy reduction of 
primacy reserves below the sate level· will cause the bank to bon"Ov or 
to tau to meet it• obligations. 
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· . Rave recent reductions caused resel"Y'8 requireml!!lnts to approach 
the point or precautionary demand on the part ot member banks? Apparently 
they have not. State m.ember banks' cash assets are now 21 per cent ot 
their total depe>sitSJ nonmember commercial bonks' caeb assets are only 
14 per cent ot their depoaits.1 Thus, the nonmembers with the gen:'!rally 
lower·require.ments are taking advantnse or opportunities torn greater 
proportionot earning o.sseta.2 
·'. ; . , A conclusion m1sht be reached that canplete removal. ot reserve 
reqU1remente .1s possible w1 th the Federal Reserve :Boord empowered to 
reinstitute them at o.ny time (a standby- basis). T.b9 floor ot primary 
reserves which tbe commercial bo.nkS must have to carry on their· oper-
ations might serve as e.n appropriate .fulcrum just ea legal reserves 
DOW' do. Syet~ open market oiierationa have cane to represent the pre-
dani wmt monetary tool 1n recent years. On the other hand, it is 
probable that the central bank would suffer a loss of control suff'icient 
lFederal Reserve l3ulletin1 op. cit., P• 1550. 
2;rhis may be due in part to their l~rger proportion of time 
deposits. 
.,.\,H~ .... rAq-<.~~.1'"'<. AiL". 
l'AUL. H, nc-,;(.l . .>\'~, iL..L • 
. h)~,f-r'ti 'i. CL!\1'.i:K, rA. 
\\,.,._._.·:·r .. 
J " ' ~ .' • 
' \ ~ .. 
'* ~ . -. ; . ,, ·- .. ·' ~ .. •-" ,., '· ...... 
The Heller proposals represent ~ giant step in the right 
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direction. It these are embra;:;ed by both the centrnl bnnk and the can-
mercial. banking associations, it is likely they will be adopted 'Within 
a few yea.rs. 
;.' •.. ) .. 
There is little emphasis pl.eced upon the study of economic 
$\lbJects in~public education, and most !imericans understand little about 
..:·~L··",; ..... ..<1:0 ~:...)~ 
their ooney and banking systems. In some vnys the average Americcn seems 
to:bave~&· kind' of eighteenth century attitude taJard economic problems. 
Banldng lavsiprobably renect to a degree t.be kind of social or economic 
i'o;~}:-.·~.~·:. L~~rJn c:.!. ~ 
awat"enaas ot the general populace. The general. view that legal reserves 
lr1 t!11._"; : ~.: 
are; cli1efly · e., source of liquidity is manifested in many qunrters. The 
monetary authorities express a sense or ave 1n contemplnting the.rapid 
:..:c l'V(_' ~ · 
d.mlopnent.ot monetary theory and their responsibilities 1n coping 
nth. it •. George W. Mitchell, Member, Board ot Governors Of the Federo.l 
Reserve System, recently had this to say: 
~ : ' < 
' -'- '- , ' '· • ~~ I 
Where the faith is serenely confident, the mechunism that makes 
monetary policy work mey be thought ot as beiDg locked away in -
a .bl.a.ck box which cannot be opened. Where hereay or e.gnosti• 
. cism prevail monetary action may be derided c.a 11 ttle more. than 
economic voodooism. In betW'een these extremes, scholars ond 
monetar.v practitioners have 'been le.boring over the yenrs to 
improve their understanding of the ways in which monetary 
action affects the economy, \lIW.Sballled. to ndmit that in this 
worl.d there is a great deal the human mind can describe but 
very little it can fUllY explain or comprehem.l ·., 
.. 
In such a climate, it is very/epPl".Opi-iate tor .studies such as 
those witnessed over the past fev yeara':.t~ takii:-J>l(ic~:-
Encl 
laeorge w. Mitchell, "ENa1uatine; the Ettects Of Monetary Action,'' 
remarks e.t Ohio State University, Co1Ul!lbus, February 201 1964. 
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Mr. W. B. Harrison, III 
7718 Yarmouth Dr. 
Richmond 25, Va. 
Dear Mr. Harrison: 
EXHIBIT l 
COMMITTEE ON BANKING AND CURRENCY 
December 17, 1963 
In your letter of December 13 you ask for in-
formation and material which might be helpful in preparing 
a paper on the subject of recent proposals for changes 
in the legal reserve requirements of commercial banks in 
the United States. 
This Committee considered the question of re-
serve requirements at length during the 1st session of 
the 86th Congress. As a result of these hearings, Public 
Law 86-114 was enacted, making a number of basic changes 
in the laws relating to reserve requirements. I enclose 
copies of this Committee's hearings on the bill, together 
with copies of the reports of this Committee and the House 
Banking and Currency Committee and the Conference report. 
I believe these will be the most helpful inf'or-
mation which I.can send you. No further proposals have 
been presented to the Committee in the form of bills. 
AWR:hc 
Encl 
With kind regards, I am 
Sincerely ~rs., '-. 
--""""""-~ ~"(=>~ 
Willis Robertson 
Chairman 
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